In the D.C. Circuit, "a lawyer who advises his client whether to accept a plea offer falls below the threshold of reasonable performance if the lawyer makes a ‘plainly incorrect’ estimate of the likely sentence due to ignorance of applicable law of which he ‘should have been aware.’ "United States v. Booze, 293 F.3d 516 , 518 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ); see alsoUnited States v. Hanson , 339 F.3d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that failure to apply career offender enhancement in making Guidelines estimate was deficient, but finding no prejudice); United States v. Caso , 723 F.3d 215, 224 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (commenting in the context of whether the statutory maximum or Guidelines range should be used to determine the seriousness of an offense that "our cases have made clear that a defense counsel's conduct may be constitutionally deficient if counsel fails to advise his client of the correct Guidelines range he would face upon taking a plea"). In the Sixth Circuit, "[c]ompetent representation ... demands that counsel explore the range of penalties a defendant is facing under likely guidelines calculation scenarios as completely as possible.

Representation is deficient when counsel fails to protect his client's interests in accord with the prevailing norms for criminal defense counsel or offers a " ‘plainly incorrect’ estimate of the likely sentence due to ignorance of applicable law of which he ‘should have been aware.’ " United States v. Booze , 293 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Gaviria , 116 F.3d at 1512 ). The former situation is illustrated in Abney , 812 F.3d at 1092, where counsel's failure to seek a continuance of sentencing so his client could benefit from a likely imminent favorable amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, as other defense counsel had done, meant Abney was unable to benefit from a five-year reduction in a mandatory minimum that would have been available.

The government does not dispute that Daum's failure to take into account the career offender provisions of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 — and hence to recognize that Hanson's post-plea sentencing range would be 262 to 327 months rather than 121 to 151 — was constitutionally deficient. See United States v. Booze, 293 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("This circuit has held that a lawyer who advises his client whether to accept a plea offer falls below the threshold of reasonable performance if the lawyer makes a plainly incorrect estimate of the likely sentence due to ignorance of applicable law of which he should have been aware." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Indeed, our cases have made clear that a defense counsel's conduct may be constitutionally deficient if counsel fails to advise his client of the correct Guidelines range he would face upon taking a plea. See United States v. Hanson, 339 F.3d 983, 990 (D.C.Cir.2003); United States v. Booze, 293 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C.Cir.2002); United States v. McCoy, 215 F.3d 102, 108 (D.C.Cir.2000); United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1512 (D.C.Cir.1997); cf.U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2 cmt. (“The Commission encourages the prosecuting attorney prior to the entry of a plea of guilty ... to disclose to the defendant the facts and circumstances ... that are relevant to the application of the sentencing guidelines.”). This reliance on the Guidelines is plainly logical.

As in Hanson, "there is no question but that a competent attorney would have advised [the defendant] of the mandatory minimum sentence he faced" if he decided not to plead. 339 F.3d at 991 (citing United States v. Booze, 293 F.3d 516, 518-19 (D.C. Cir.2002)). The 360 to life range results from a criminal history category of VI and an offense level of 37, with no reduction in the latter for acceptance of responsibility as in the case of a plea, see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n. 2.

Given the district court's legal error on the first theory of liability, and considering the close relationship between the factual predicates supporting that theory and those underlying the Griggs claim, we think it best to remand the case so that the district court may have the opportunity to further develop the evidence in a manner consistent with a proper interpretation of the law. See United States v. Booze, 293 F.3d 516, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Kurdziel v. Pittsburgh Tube Co., 416 F.2d 882, 886 (6th Cir. 1969). V.

It is well-settled that “a lawyer who advises his client whether to accept a plea offer falls below the threshold of reasonable performance if the lawyer makes a plainly incorrect estimate of the likely sentence due to ignorance of applicable law of which he should have been aware.” United States v. Booze, 293 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Even if it is true that plea counsel estimated Mr. Fairlamb's sentence to be one year, it is not clear that this was “plainly incorrect,” especially given Mr. Fairlamb's early acceptance of responsibility and cooperation with the government's investigation, among other factors.

The two United States Court of Appeals cases that Movant cites (Doc. 38 at 3) are unavailing because neither involved a guilty plea. See United States v. Booze, 293 F.3d 516, 517-18 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("An inmate serving a 17 1/2-year sentence filed a § 2255 motion alleging, among other things, that his attorney caused him to reject a plea offer with a five-year sentence by advising him erroneously that he would be sentenced to less than five years if he went to trial and was convicted. . . . On appeal, the Government . . . asks the court to remand the case for the district court to determine, after an evidentiary hearing, whether such a plea offer was in fact made. Over the appellant's objection, we follow the course urged by the Government.

In addition, "a lawyer who advises his client whether to accept a plea offer falls below the threshold of reasonable performance if the lawyer makes a 'plainly incorrect' estimate of the likely sentence due to ignorance of applicable law of which he 'should have been aware.'" United States v. Booze, 293 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 380 (2d Cir. 1998) ("By grossly underestimating Gordon's sentencing exposure in a letter to his client, Dedes breached his duty as a defense lawyer in a criminal case 'to advise his client fully on whether a particular plea to a charge appears desirable.'" (citation omitted)). Unpublished cases are cited for the persuasiveness of their reasoning, not for any precedential value.

United States v. Hurt,527 F.3d 1347, 1356 (D.C.Cir.2008). This Circuit has recognized that a lawyer who makes a plainly incorrect estimate of a likely sentence due to ignorance of applicable law of which he should have been aware while advising his client on the prudence of accepting a plea offer falls below the threshold of reasonable performance within the meaning of the Stricklandstandard. United States v. Booze,293 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C.Cir.2002). Second, a defendant must show that the error caused him prejudice.