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U.S. v. Bond
171 F.3d 1047 (6th Cir. 1999)4 Citing cases
U.S. v. Rodgers
278 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2002) Cited 27 timesHolding that the total sentencing term, not the component sentences, matters when determining whether judicial vindictiveness occurred
When a district judge sentences a defendant after a remand, the judge is permitted to revisit the entire sentencing procedure, unless she is restricted in her review by the remand order. United States v. Bond, 171 F.3d 1047, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). When the remand order does not restrict the district court in its reassessment of its sentence, the court remains free to rely upon "any legitimate factors" when making its determination, as long as it rules without vindictiveness.
U.S. v. Jackson
181 F.3d 740 (6th Cir. 1999) Cited 43 timesFinding that "the reasons given by the district court fail to ensure that a nonvindictive rationale led to the second, higher sentence"
Accordingly, due process compelled the district court to give "objective reasons" for imposing a higher sentence on Defendant on remand than the one it imposed prior to his appeal. It is for the absence of similar factual scenarios in United States v. Bond, 171 F.3d 1047, 1049 (6th Cir. 1999), and United States v. Pasquarille, 130 F.3d 1220, 1223 (6th Cir. 1997), that these decisions do not apply to this case. In Bond, this Court found no vindictiveness in sentencing when a district judge resentenced a defendant under a higher criminal category without citing new developments in the defendant's criminal history.
U.S. v. Abboud
441 F. App'x 331 (6th Cir. 2011) Cited 5 timesHolding defendant's "failure to raise the issue of the applicability of the [correct] manual at any . . . sentencing hearings . . . constitutes a forfeiture of the claim that he was erroneously sentenced, which cannot now be considered without a showing of plain error"
On remand, a district court may impose a different sentence as long as it is consistent with the appellate decision and mandate contained in the remand order and is not based on vindictiveness. See United States v. Bond, 171 F.3d 1047, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999). Thus, just as with a defendant's original sentence, a new sentence within the guidelines is afforded a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.
U.S. v. Barber
200 F.3d 908 (6th Cir. 2000) Cited 7 timesBecause the basis for the departure by the sentencing court was an encouraged factor under the Guidelines, we review the decision of the trial court to depart for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Bond, 171 F.3d 1047 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Koeberlein, 161 F.3d 946 (6th Cir. 1998). As noted by the Supreme Court, "[a] district court's decision to depart from the Guidelines . . . will in most cases be due substantial deference, for it embodies the traditional exercise of discretion by a sentencing court."