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holding that a lay person is entitled to represent only himself, not any other person or entity
Summary of this case from W. Coast Life Ins. Co. v. GormanOpinion
Case No. 8:01-cv-844-T-23MSS
February 13, 2003
ORDER
On April 30, 2001, the relator, proceeding pro se, filed a qui tam complaint for violations of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, et seq., against Blake Medical Center and Integrated Health Services of Bradenton. On February 19, 2002, the United States declined to intervene (Doc. 8), and, accordingly, on July 22, 2002, the complaint was unsealed and subsequently served on the defendants. On August 23, 2002, the relator filed an amended complaint (Doc. 12). Blake Medical Center (BMC) moves to dismiss the amended complaint (Doc. 15), arguing that the pro se relator, a non-lawyer, is prohibited from litigating in behalf of the United States in a qui tam action. Axiomatically, a lay person is entitled to represent only himself, not any other person or entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 ("In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel ") (emphasis added); Local Rule 2.01(a) ("No person shall be permitted to appear or be heard as counsel for another in any proceeding in this Court unless first admitted to the practice in this Court pursuant to this rule. . . .); Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02, 113 S. Ct 716, 721 (1993) (noting that non-natural persons or "artificial entities" (e.g., corporations, partnerships, and associations) "may appear in federal courts only through licensed counsel"). Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transo. Auth., 722 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1983), succinctly summarizes the reasons for requiring an attorney to represent non-natural persons:
BMC advances several additional arguments for dismissal, including failure to plead fraud with particularity and failure to allege the elements of a False Claims Act violation. BMC also argues that the rotator's complaint is "a disguised attempt to assert a claim for medical malpractice resulting in wrongful death' that is barred by the statute of limitations (Doc. 15).
[T]he conduct of litigation by a non-lawyer creates unusual burdens not only for the party he represents but as well for his adversaries and the court. The lay litigant frequently brings pleadings that are awkwardly drafted, motions that are inarticulately presented, [and] proceedings that are needlessly multiplicative. In addition to lacking the professional skills of a lawyer, the lay litigant lacks many of the attorney's ethical responsibilities, e.g., to avoid litigating unfounded or vexatious claims.
In a qui tam action, the United States remains at all times the "real party in interest," regardless of whether the United States declines to intervene. United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1994); see also United States ex rel. Milam v. Univ. of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. 961 F.2d 46, 50 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he United States is the real party in interest in any False Claims Act suit, even where it permits a qui tam relator to pursue the action on its behalf). Accordingly, a pro se litigant cannot represent the United States in a qui tam action.See Safir v. Blackwell, 579 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1978);United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1951); United States ex rel. Schwartz v. TRW, Inc., 118 F. Supp.2d 991 (C.D.Cal. 2000); United States ex rel. Tyler v. California, No. Civ. 8982130 — GEB — JFM, 1999 WL 33456979 (E.D.Cal. September 24, 1999).
In United States ex. rel. Schwartz v. TRW. Inc., 118 F. Supp.2d 991 (C.D.Cal. 2000), the district court granted a motion to disqualify a pro se, non-lawyer relator and dismissed without prejudice the relator's qui tam claims. The court justified the decision in part on the rector's filing of "incomprehensible documents both in the form of motions and discovery requests" and "multiple motions on a continuous basis without merit/litigation practice which the court found "woefully inadequate." Similarly, in the instant action, the relator has filed two lengthy and largely unintelligible complaints and a parade of procedurally inadequate and substantively enigmatic motions. The record reveals the relator's inability to handle, pro se, the complexities inherent in the prosecution of a Medicare fraud action under the False Claims Act.
Although the amended complaint is accompanied by voluminous documents that the relator alleges support her claim, the amended complaint contains no adequate (or decipherable) explanation of the significance of these documents.
Examples of the relator's erratic motion practice include a "Notice of Unavailability and to Postpone Further Action Until After End of the Vacation" (Doc. 10) and a "Motion for Clarification/or in the Alternative to Compel Court Notification and to Obey the Current Laws of Florida and the United States if Possible." (Doc. 31). Further, since BMC's proper filing of a "motion for clarification" (Doc. 19), which resulted in the Courts amendment of a previous order (Doc. 20), the relator has adopted the "motion for clarification" as her primary means of communication with the Court.
Accordingly, because both the relevant legal authority and the particular circumstances of the instant action prohibit the relator from continued prosecution of this action in behalf of the United States, BMC's motion to dismiss (Doc. 15) is GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Upon retention of counsel, the relator may move to reopen the action on or before March 11, 2003. The Clerk is directed to (1) terminate any pending motions and (2) close the file.
ORDERED in Tampa.