. However, โ[a] final judgment is โvoid' for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) only if the court that considered it lacked jurisdiction, either as to the subject matter of the dispute or over the parties to be bound, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.โ U.S. v. Berke, 170 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1999).
"A final judgment is 'void' for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) only if the court that considered it lacked jurisdiction, either as to the subject matter of the dispute or over the parties to be bound, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law." United States v. Berke, 170 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a complete lack of jurisdiction "must be distinguished from an error in the exercise of jurisdiction."
Under Rule 60(b)(4), a final judgment is void โonly if the court that considered it lacked jurisdiction . . . or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process.โ United States v. Berke, 170 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1999).
"A final judgment is "void" for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) only if the court that considered it lacked jurisdiction, either as to the subject matter of the dispute or over the parties to be bound, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law." U.S. v. Berke, 170 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff does not contend the Court lacked jurisdiction over this dispute.
A final judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4) "only in the rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard." United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270-71 (2010); see also United States v. Berke, 170 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1999) ("A final judgment is 'void' for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) only if the court that considered it lacked [subject matter or personal jurisdiction] or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law."). A judgment is "not void merely because it is erroneous."
" Furthermore, "[a] final judgment is 'void' for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) only if the court that considered it lacked jurisdiction, either as to the subject matter of the dispute or over the parties to be bound, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law." United States v. Berke, 170 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing In re Ctr. Wholesale, Inc., 759 F.2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 1985)). Next, Rule 60(b)(5) allows relief from a final judgment or order when "the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable.
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), a court must set aside a final judgment as void if the court lacked jurisdiction over the parties. See Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Internet Solutions for Bus., Inc., 509 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing U.S. v. Berke, 170 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1999)). A court may not exercise power over a party without service of process or waiver of service by the defendant.
A final judgment is void, and therefore must be set aside, "if the court that considered it lacked jurisdiction . . . over the parties to be bound." United States v. Berke, 170 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1999). One ground for challenging the district court's jurisdiction under Rule 60(b)(4) is improper service.
The district court properly dismissed Jones's remaining claims as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because defendants were parties or in privity with parties in prior actions. See Trujillo v. County of Santa Clara, 775 F.2d 1359, 1367 (9th Cir. 1985) (listing elements of res judicata under California law and explaining that "[p]rivity . . . exists when a person [is] so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Jones's motion for reconsideration under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), 60(b)(4), and 60(b)(6) because Jones failed to establish any basis for relief. See United States v. Berke, 170 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1999) ("A final judgment is 'void' for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) only if the court that considered it lacked jurisdiction, either as to the subject matter of the dispute or over the parties to be bound, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law."); Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1017 (9th Cir. 1998) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that Rule 60(b)(6) is to be used "sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Even if the district court erred in not reconsidering the dismissal of Jones's FDCPA claim on the basis of res judicata, any such error was harmless because the claim failed on its merits.
The bankruptcy court properly denied Melcher's Rule 60(b)(4) motion because Melcher failed to establish that the bankruptcy court "lacked jurisdiction, either as to the subject matter of the dispute or over the parties to be bound, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law." United States v. Berke, 170 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024 (applying Rule 60 to bankruptcy proceedings with limited exceptions); United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010) ("Rule 60(b)(4) applies only in the rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard."). Contrary to Melcher's contentions, the proceedings at issue did not violate her due process rights because the record shows that she received adequate notice of the hearing on the trustee's motion under 11 U.S.C. ยง 363(f)(4), and an opportunity to be heard.