Id. At the time of Secrest's sentencing, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, entitled "Imposition of a Sentence on a Defendant Subject to an Undischarged Term of Imprisonment," constrained Judge Miller's sentencing discretion under § 3584.See Ruggiano, 307 F.3d at 127; United States v. Dorsey, 166 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Bell, 28 F.3d 615, 618-19 (7th Cir. 1994). As the Third Circuit explained, "§ 5G1.3 . . . is intended to coordinate the sentencing process 'with an eye toward having such punishments approximate the total penalty that would have been imposed had the sentences for the different offenses been imposed at the same time (i.e., had all of the offenses been prosecuted in a single proceeding).'"

The court properly ordered the federal prison term to run concurrently with the remainder of the state prison term based on its determination that Ross's burglary conviction was "fully taken into account" in the offense level calculation. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 28 F.3d 615, 618-19 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Evans, 1 F.3d 654, 654 (7th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). But instead of sentencing Ross to 154 months, as Ross had argued was appropriate, the court sentenced Ross to 188 months and attempted to order the BOP to give Ross a 34-month credit against that term.

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, App. Note 4. Although we have placed particular emphasis on whether the defendant exercised control over other participants in criminal activity ( Fones, 51 F.3d at 666; United States v. Brown, 944 F.2d 1377, 1381 (7th Cir. 1991)), our overall focus on "relative responsibility" means that no one factor is essential to application of this enhancement. Fones, 51 F.3d at 665-66; Skinner, 986 F.2d at 1099; see also United States v. Bell, 28 F.3d 615, 617 (7th Cir. 1994). We have therefore affirmed enhancements under section 3B1.1(c) if the defendant "`was a key figure who coordinated and organized the criminal activity'" even if he did not necessarily control another participant.

Five involved an explicit double-counting bar in the text of the guidelines and thus are not controversial. See United States v. Eubanks, 593 F.3d 645, 649–50 (7th Cir.2010) (interpreting U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 cmt. n. 4); United States v. Podhorn, 549 F.3d 552, 559 (7th Cir.2008) (interpreting U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n. 9); United States v. Katalinic, 510 F.3d 744, 746–48 (7th Cir.2007) (interpreting U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 cmt. n. 4); United States v. Bustamante, 493 F.3d 879, 889–90 (7th Cir.2007) (same); United States v. Bell, 28 F.3d 615, 618 (7th Cir.1994) (interpreting U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) & cmt. n. 2). In one case the district court inexplicably engrafted a cumulative statutory sentence on the wrong guidelines range, an obvious (and apparently inadvertent) error.

See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) cmt. n. 2 (referring to "conduct taken into account"). Courts in other circuits have also focused on offense conduct, although without explicit discussion of the question. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 46 F.3d 442, 445-46 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bell, 28 F.3d 615, 618-19 (7th Cir. 1994). Although prior offense conduct might technically qualify as "relevant conduct" in a federal prosecution, a defendant cannot enjoy the benefits of section 5G1.3(b) unless the district court in fact incorporated his prior offense as relevant conduct in the instant prosecution.

"We have . . . affirmed enhancements under section 3B1.1(c) if the defendant was a key figure who coordinated and organized the criminal activity, even if he did not necessarily control another participant." United States v. Granado, 72 F.3d 1287, 1290 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also United States v. Bell, 28 F.3d 615, 617-18 (7th Cir. 1994) (listing factors that distinguish "organizers and leaders" from "rank and file criminals"). The government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an enhancement is warranted.

Under section 5G1.3(b), the district court does not award a Willis credit (because this is time that will be awarded by the BOP) but does award credit for the remainder of the prefederal sentencing time (because the BOP cannot award this under section 3585(b)). We note that the courts in Kiefer and Drake did not see any difficulty in applying section 5G1.3(b) nor did the courts in United States v. Bell, 28 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 1994), or United States v. Hicks, 4 F.3d 1358 (6th Cir. 1993), cases in which the courts also applied section 5G1.3(b). Contrary to the government's position, any error in the section 5G1.3(b) sentence adjustment can be corrected on direct appeal. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2), the defendant can appeal an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines and under section 3742(b)(2), the government may do the same.

See United States v. Brown, 944 F.2d 1377, 1380 (7th Cir. 1991) (isolated incident of giving direction to another does not warrant enhancement). See United States v. Bell, 28 F.3d 615, 618 (7th Cir. 1994) (concluding sec. 3B1.1 enhancement was improper without evidence tending to show that the defendant claimed a larger cut of the proceeds or exercised control over another co-conspirator or over drugs). See Brown, 944 F.2d at 1380-81 (providing site for unloading truck shipments of marijuana did not justify sec. 3B1.1 enhancement); United States v. Tamez, 941 F.2d 770, 777 (9th Cir. 1991) (providing place for illegal drug activities does not warrant enhancement).

Under subsection (b), when a trial judge is sentencing a defendant who is still serving prison time from an offense that has "been fully taken into account in the determination of the offense level for the instant offense," the judge is to order that the defendant's sentence run concurrently with the undischarged term of imprisonment. United States v. Bell, 28 F.3d 615, 618-19 (7th Cir. 1994). However, Charles had completed his state incarceration at the time he was before the court for sentencing in the instant offense.

(n. 4). This court has relied upon these factors in determining whether a defendant qualifies as a supervisor or manager. Young, 34 F.3d at 507; United States v. Skinner, 986 F.2d 1091, 1096 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Brown, 944 F.2d 1377, 1380 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1991). See also United States v. Bell, 28 F.3d 615, 617 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Ramos, 932 F.2d 611, 618 (7th Cir. 1991). The central purpose of § 3B1.1 is to punish a defendant for his relative responsibility within a criminal organization.