We review the district court's determination of the constitutionality of a federal statute de novo. United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 215 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1197, 120 S.Ct. 1262, 146 L.Ed.2d 117 (2000). Napier's contention that § 922(g)(8) violates the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution are not unprecedented.
He cites no authority for the proposition that his inability to present testimony at a DVO hearing from someone besides himself is insufficient under Section 922(g)(8). The United States responds, relying on United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211 (6th Cir. 1999), for the proposition that, "even when a particular status arises from a formal proceeding, the nature of that proceeding has no effect on the constitutionality of a § 922(g)(8) prosecution." (Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Mot. Dismiss 3, DN 23 (quoting Baker, 197 F.3d at 217)).
Lambert, 355 U.S. at 232 (Frankfurter, J., joined by Harlan, J., and Whittaker, J., dissenting). I also acknowledge that the district court's rejection of the "Lambert exception" for offenses under § 922(g)(9)-that is, rejection of a due process requirement that the government prove that the defendant knew or should have known of the prohibitions of § 922(g)(9)-is in keeping with every majority decision of a Circuit Court of Appeals to address the question, as to either § 922(g)(9), the statute now before this court, or its companion provision, § 922(g)(8). See Mitchell, 209 F.3d at 323-24 (§ 922(g)(9)); Beavers, 206 F.3d at 708-10 (§ 922(g)(9)); United States Reddick, 203 F.3d 767, 769- 771 (10th Cir. 2000) (§ 922(g)(8)); United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 216-17 218-220 (6th Cir. 1999) (§ 922(g)(8)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1262 (2000); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 225-226 (1st Cir. 1999) (although the defendant was charged with violating both § 922(g)(8) and § 922(g)(9), the comparable due process challenge was leveled only against § 922(g)(8)); Bostic, 168 F.3d at 722 (§ 922(g)(8)); Wilson, 159 F.3d at 289 (§ 922(g)(8)). Although this list is impressive, I do not find that the decisions listed are ultimately persuasive.
Every circuit that has considered the issue of lack of notice with respect to § 922(g)(8) has rejected arguments similar to Defendant's. See United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 2383 (1999); United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 2371 (1999). In support of his due process argument, Defendant cites Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
Courts addressing the question have uniformly failed to find a fundamental right to possess firearms. See, e.g., United States v. Hancock, 231 F.3d 557, 566 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 989 (2001); United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 216 (6th Cir. 1999); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 709 (7th Cir. 1999). Also, Defendant asserts only the broader argument that section 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional on its face.
At the outset, we must clarify that Whitfield's argument invoking the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection guarantees is instead properly grounded in the Fifth Amendment, which is "applicable to the federal government." United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 215 n.1 (6th Cir. 1999). Although the Fifth Amendment "does not explicitly guarantee equal protection of the laws[,] . . . the United States Supreme Court has found that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment encompasses an equal protection guarantee."
"Because it is not reasonable for someone in his position to expect to possess dangerous weapons free from extensive regulation, [the defendant] cannot successfully claim a lack of fair warning with respect to the requirements of § 922(g)(8)." United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1999). We therefore conclude that Miller's alleged lack of awareness was not reasonable, in light of the text of the order and the fact that he was subject to a restraining order.
One of the basic tenets of due process jurisprudence is that citizens are afforded fair notice of precisely what conduct is prohibited. United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 218-19 (6th Cir. 1999); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957). If a statute is "so technical or obscure that it threatens to ensnare individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct," notice will not be presumed.
The doctrine that ignorance of the law is no excuse is a "deeply embedded principle[] in our American legal tradition." United States v. Ali 557 F.3d 715, 726 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 218 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1197, 120 S.Ct. 1262, 146 L.Ed.2d 117 (2000). In one sense, then, we can easily reject Svoboda's contention because he basically argues that he followed the erroneous legal interpretation provided by Sovereign. Furthermore, even when we view Svoboda's arguments in the more narrow context of the denial of his proposed jury instruction, we reach the same result, for two reasons.
A citizen may be presumed to know the content of the law so long as the relevant statute is not "so technical or obscure that it threatens to ensnare individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct." UnitedStates v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 219 (6th Cir. 1999). We conclude that 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) is not so technical or obscure that an individual in the long-term healthcare business would be oblivious to its prohibitions and criminal penalties, particularly because the statute requires the individual to act with the intent to fraudulently secure payments.