As the Supreme Court has made clear, while a criminal defendant who proceeds pro se may, like any other pro se litigant, have a fool for a client, that does not mean that he or she is presumptively incompetent[.]” 307 Fed.Appx. 876, 879 (6th Cir.2008) (citing Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n. 13, 113 S.Ct. 2680). “While defendant's decision may have been ill-advised, the district court did enough to ascertain that defendant was capable of understanding the consequences of his course of action.”
As the Supreme Court has made clear, while a criminal defendant who proceeds pro se may, like any other pro se litigant, have a fool for a client, that does not mean that he or she is presumptively incompetent[.]" 307 F. App'x 876, 879 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n.13). "While defendant's decision may have been ill-advised, the district court did enough to ascertain that defendant was capable of understanding the consequences of his course of action." Id.
Second, there is the fact that every court to consider Edwards in the context of a federal criminal trial has thus far taken it for granted that its holding controls. See DeShazer, 554 F.3d at 1289-90; United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1267 n. 9 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Back, 307 Fed.Appx. 876, 879 (6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished); United States v. Arenburg, 2008 WL 3286444, *4-5 (W.D.N.Y. Aug.7, 2008) (unpublished); United States v. Dilley, 2008 WL 3091263, *1-2 (N.D.Ind. Aug.5, 2008) (unpublished); United States v. Duncan, 2008 WL 2954976, *2-3 (D.Idaho July 29, 2008) (unpublished).