Opinion
No. 10-20111 Summary Calendar.
September 15, 2010.
Jeffery Alan Babcock, James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attornej's Office, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, H. Michael Sokolow, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender's Office, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, USDC No. 4:09-CR-268-1.
Before DAVIS, SMITH, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
Edilberto Ayestas Zelaya pled guilty to illegal reentry following deportation after conviction of an aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a), (b)(1), and was sentenced to twenty-three months in prison. Ayestas Zelaya appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court erred when it increased his offense level by eight levels to pursuant U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). Ayestas Zelaya argues his second state conviction for simple possession did not constitute an aggravated felony but concedes that his argument is foreclosed by United States v. Cepeda-Rios, 530 F.3d 333, 335-36 (5th Cir. 2008).
After Ayestas Zelaya filed his brief, however, the Supreme Court held in an immigration proceeding that "when a defendant has been convicted of a simple possession offense that has not been enhanced based on the fact of a prior conviction, he has not been `convicted' under [8 U.S.C] § 1229b(a)(3) of a `felony punishable' as such `under the Controlled Substances Act. `" Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2577, 2589, 177 L.Ed.2d 68 (2010). The Supreme Court noted that "[t]he mere possibility that the defendant's conduct, coupled with facts outside of the record of conviction, could have authorized a felony conviction under federal law is insufficient. . . ." Id.
Ayestas Zelaya now moves, without opposition, to vacate and remand for resentencing. IT IS ORDERED that, in light of Carachuri-Rosendo, Ayestas Zelaya's motion to vacate his sentence and to remand his case to the district court for resentencing is GRANTED. The motion to issue the mandate forthwith is also GRANTED.