As the Eighth Circuit has held, “Section 3582(b) does not grant jurisdiction to a district court to do anything, let alone correct an illegal sentence.” United States v. Auman, 8 F.3d 1268, 1271 (8th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Abrams, 137 F.3d 704, 707 (2d Cir. 1998). Similarly, the relevant provisions of Section 3742 “do not grant jurisdiction to a district court to review a final sentence” - rather, they merely “direct[] that [any] notice of appeal [from a final judgment] must be filed in that court.” Auman, 8 F.3d at 1271; see also United States v. Burridge, 125 Fed.Appx. 961,963 (10th Cir. 2005).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has said that § 3582(c)(2) is jurisdictional. United States v. Auman, 8 F.3d 1268 (8th Cir. 1993). It did so, however, years before the Supreme Court began its unbroken line of clarifying precedent.

Thus, a defendant urging a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) must demonstrate that the Sentencing Commission has lowered the applicable guideline sentencing range, and that the reduction is consistent with the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. See United States v. Auman, 8 F.3d 1268, 1271 (8th Cir. 1993). If the defendant cannot satisfy the first requirement, the court lacks jurisdiction to consider the reduction request. See Auman, 8 F.3d at 1271; see also United States v. Lawrence, 535 F.3d 631, 637-38 (7th Cir. 2008).

II. DISCUSSION The statute on which the instant motion is based — § 3742 — by its terms, applies to appellate review of a sentence by a court of appeals.United States v. Auman, 8 F.3d 1268, 1270-71 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting § 3742 concerns the basis for appellate review of district court's sentencing decisions; it does not grant jurisdiction to district court to review final sentence); United States v. Worthy, No. 01-3623, 36 Fed. Appx. 177, 178 (6th Cir. May 15, 2002) (unpublished). The phrase "in the district court" as it appears in § 3742(a) merely "directs that the notice of appeal must be filed in that court," but does not confer appellate jurisdiction on the district court. Auman, 8 F.3d at 1271.

Rather, that section merely defines "final judgment." See id. at 1322 (citing United States v. Auman, 8 F.3d 1268, 1271 (8th Cir. 1993)). Section 3582(b), then, "does not grant jurisdiction to a district court to do anything, let alone correct an illegal sentence."

To the extent Baker seeks habeas relief in her motion to vacate, we lack jurisdiction to consider the motion. See United States v. Auman, 8 F.3d 1268, 1272 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that appellate courts lack jurisdiction to consider an original 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion).

See United States v. Starks, 551 F.3d 839, 842-43 (8th Cir. 2009). Next, we reject Carrillo's pro se challenges to his sentence, because section 3582(c)(2) confers jurisdiction only to determine whether a sentence should be reduced due to a retroactive Guidelines amendment, not for unrelated challenges to the sentence. See United States v. Auman, 8 F.3d 1268, 1271-72 (8th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we grant counsel leave to withdraw, and we affirm.

This time, the District Court docketed Jackman's filing as a motion for sentencing relief and denied it for lack of jurisdiction. As the District Court explained, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) does not confer jurisdiction on a District Court to review its own sentences, see United States v. Auman, 8 F.3d 1268, 1270-71 (8th Cir. 1993), and none of the other limited circumstances under which a District Court can modify a sentence once imposed applies here. The District Court also noted that Jackman's arguments based on his North Carolina convictions lack merit.

Still other circuits, however, have seen the issue in jurisdictional terms. See United States v. Graham, 704 F.3d 1275, 1279 (10th Cir.2013) (concluding that § 3582(c)(2) motion should have been dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because defendant was ineligible for reduced sentence); United States v. Austin, 676 F.3d 924, 930 (9th Cir.2012) (stating that district court “lacked jurisdiction” to reduce sentence when statutory criteria of § 3582(c)(2) were not satisfied); United States v. Williams, 607 F.3d 1123, 1125–26 (6th Cir.2010) (citing our decision in Poole, 550 F.3d at 678, as support for treating limits of § 3582(c)(2) as jurisdictional); United States v. Garcia, 606 F.3d 209, 212 n. 5 (5th Cir.2010); United States v. Auman, 8 F.3d 1268, 1271 (8th Cir.1993). The practical differences between our lines of cases are minimal.

Finally, we decline to remand this case for resentencing because the Sentencing Commission has not designated the amendment at issue as one that may be applied retroactively. See United States v. Auman, 8 F.3d 1268, 1272 (8th Cir. 1993) (amendment to Guidelines may not be applied retroactively unless Sentencing Commission has expressly designated it as one that may be applied retroactively). Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.