Millenium's argument also cannot be reconciled with other relevant decisions of this court and the Court of Appeals, which highlight the permissive, voluntary, and discretionary nature of the administrative mitigation proceedings in question. See United States v. Cocoa Berkau, 990 F.2d 610, 614–16 (Fed.Cir.1993); United States v. Ataka America, Inc., 17 CIT 598, 605, 826 F.Supp. 495, 501–03 (1993). Moreover, the two cases on which Millenium principally relies are simply inapposite.

Since Sherman, the question whether the protest requirement of section 14 of the 1890 Act (or its direct successor, section 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930) applies in government enforcement actions has not been the subject of many judicial decisions, but those cases that have addressed the question have uniformly treated the protest requirement as applicable to government enforcement actions. See A.S. Rosenthal Co. v. United States, 24 F.2d 351, 352 (2d Cir. 1928); United States v. Desiree Int'l U.S.A., Ltd., 497 F. Supp. 264, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Ataka Am., Inc., 826 F. Supp. 495, 503 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993). The historical background of section 1514 is thus not at all as painted by ICS.

See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(2)(A); 28 U.S.C. § 2631(a); P.L. 96-39 § 1001(b)(3), 93 Stat. 144, 305 (1979); S.REP. No. 249 at 254, reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 640; Old Republic Ins. Co. v. UnitedStates, 10 CIT 1, 625 F. Supp. 983 (1986). See also United States v. Ataka America, Inc., 17 CIT 598, 607 n. 12, 826 F. Supp. 495, 501 n. 12 (1993). Yet, as surety bearing liability on the affected importers' bonds, Lincoln's "stake" in the outcome of Commerce's proceedings cannot be said to be any less than those of petitioners asserting claims "on behalf of" an affected industry, in which context "the legislative history calls for a liberal construction of the standing requirements."

Here, BOUSA's obligation to pay liquidated duties arose prior to its filing of a bankruptcy petition, and that obligation existed independent of any protest proceedings. See United States v. Ataka America, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 495, 503 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993). Therefore, the denial of any protest was not an action "to collect, recover, or offset" a debt.

The court "declined to treat [§ 1515(a)] as providing a constructive denial of the protest." United States v. Ataka Am., Inc., 826 F. Supp. 495, 503 (CIT 1993). "[N]ormally a notice of denial is required to trigger jurisdiction, even after the expiration of the two-year period."

Id. at 360. See, e.g., United States v. Ataka America, Inc, 17 CIT 598, 600 (1993) ("[c]ourts have refused to apply the contract statute of limitations to the government where the obligation, although expressed in a contract, is essentially statutory) (citations omitted). NSC, indeed, emphasizes the absence of any reference to "interest" in subsection (d) of section 1592 among the underpayments required to be recovered where a violation of subsection (a) is discovered.

See Letter from Counsel for Plaintiff (Aug. 26, 2002) at 3. See generally United States v. Ataka Am., Inc., 17 CIT 598, 600, 826 F. Supp. 495, 497 (1993) ("[t]he general rule is that the United States is exempt from statutes of limitations unless Congress has expressly provided otherwise.") (citing United States v. City of Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d 337, 339 (5th Cir. 1981), citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132-33 (1938)).

Therefore, because no protests were filed, the classification of the twenty-three entries at issue is final and conclusive. See United States v. Ataka Am., Inc., 826 F. Supp. 495, 502 (CIT 1993) ("Failure to protest [classification] results in the finality of the decision."). Accordingly, the Court finds it lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) over those non-protested entries and grants defendant's motion dismissing the twenty-three entries at issue with respect to the classification cause of action.

Unless such protest is filed, the liquidation is final. See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a);United States v. Utex Int'l., Inc., 857 F.2d 1408, 1409-11, 1413-14 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Customs' decisions merging into liquidation must be protested to avoid finality); United States v. Ataka America, Inc., 17 CIT 598, 606, 826 F. Supp. 495, 502 (1993) (same); Halperin Shipping Co., Inc. v. United States, 14 CIT 438, 442, 742 F. Supp. 1163, 1167 (1990) (same). Under the heading, "Protest against decisions of Customs Service," the statute provides, in relevant part:

Non-mandatory administrative procedures do not toll the statute of limitations. United States v. Ataka Am., Inc., 17 CIT 598, 605, 826 F. Supp. 495, 501-02 (1993). Thus, the question remains — should the court provide a less onerous procedure for persons who are not interested in pursuing their claims through whatever administrative procedures now exist or through individual litigation, the cost of which procedure will be borne by the taxpayers?