And, DuPont says that Kolon has not met that burden. DuPont cites the following authorities in this order in its memorandum on this point: Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies, § 5.16(1) (2d ed. 1993); Williams v. Chittendon Trust Co., 145 Vt. 76, 84, 484 A.2d 911, 915 (1984); Wood v. Cunard, 192 F. 293, 296 (2d Cir. 1911); Long v. Arthur Robloff Co., 22 Ill. App.3d 1012, 1025, 327 N.E.2d 346, 354-55 (1975); Taft v. Smith, Gray Co., 76 Misc. 283, 284-88, 134 N.Y.S. 1011 (1912); United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Md. 1994)).LEGAL STANDARD

Moreover, the Maryland Supreme Court has recognized that " 'a living cell line is a property interest capable of protection' and as such, there is 'no reason why a cell line should not be considered a chattel.' " Yuan v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 452 Md. 436, 157 A.3d 254, 270 (2017) (quoting United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091, 1099 (D. Md. 1994), aff'd, 56 F.3d 62 (4th Cir. 1995)). The HeLa cells in Ultragenyx's possession are part of the HeLa cell line—that very sort of chattel.

Under Maryland law, trespass to chattel is defined as "an intentional use or intermeddling with the chattel in possession of another," resulting in a "chattel [that] is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value." United States v. Arora, 860 F.Supp. 1091, 1097 (D.Md. 1994) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 217(b), 218(b)) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd, 56 F.3d 62 (4th Cir. 1995). Similarly, "a claim for conversion requires: (1) the plaintiff's right to possess the disputed property, and (2) an intentional taking of that property by a person without authority or permission."

In Maryland, trespass to chattel "has been defined as an intentional use or intermeddling with the chattel in possession of another . . . , such intermeddling occurring . . . when 'the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value.'" United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (D. Md. 1994) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 217(b), 218(b)), aff'd, 56 F.3d 62 (4th Cir. 1995); accord Ground Zero Museum Workshop v. Wilson, 813 F. Supp. 2d 678, 697 (D. Md. 2011). Conversion is defined as "'an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.'"

In Maryland, trespass to chattels "has been defined as an intentional use or intermeddling with the chattel in possession of another . . . , such intermeddling occurring . . . when 'the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value.'" United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (D. Md. 1994) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 217(b), 218(b)), aff'd, 56 F.3d 62 (4th Cir. 1995); accord Ground Zero Museum Workshop v. Wilson, 813 F. Supp. 2d 678, 697 (D. Md. 2011). Conversion is defined as "'an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.'"

As to Count IX, conversion is "an intentional exercise of dominion or control over chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel." United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (D. Md. 1994), aff'd 56 F.3d 62 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 222A(1)); see also Staub v. Staub, 376 A.2d 1129, 1131 (Md. 1977) ("The gist of a conversion is not the acquisition of the property by the wrongdoer, but the wrongful deprivation of a person of property to the possession of which he is entitled."). To make out a claim for conversion, a plaintiff must therefore first adequately allege a trespass: he must allege that the defendant exercised dominion or control over chattel rightly belonging to the plaintiff.

D. Count VII: Trespass/Conversion In Count VII, again, Plaintiff's allegations are imprecise in that they allege that Defendants either converted or trespassed upon certain of Plaintiff's property. Although “the difference between [trespass and conversion] is fundamentally one of degree,” United States v. Arora, 860 F.Supp. 1091, 1098 (D.Md.1994), there is a substantial difference in the appropriate measure of damages: In trespass the plaintiff may recover for the diminished value of his chattel because of any damage to it, or for the damage to his interest in its possession or use.... [I]n the action for conversion, title to the chattel passes to [the defendant], so that he is in effect required to buy it at a forced judicial sale.

” EDI Precast, LLC v. Carnahan, 982 F.Supp.2d 616, 629 (D. Md. 2013) (quoting United States v. Arora, 860 F.Supp. 1091 (D. Md. 1994), aff'd, 56 F.3d 62 (4th Cir. 1995)). Unlike conversion, trespass to chattels does not require “the exercise of unauthorized dominion and control to the complete exclusion of the rightful possessor.”

See, e.g., United States v. Arora, 860 F.Supp. 1091, 1096 (D. Md. 1994) (“[T]he United States filed this civil suit against Dr. Arora, claiming compensatory and punitive damages for what it alleged was his conversion of or trespass against its property.”), aff'd, 56 F.3d 62 (4th Cir. 1995); Agropex Int'l Inc. v. Access World (USA) LLC, Civ. No. 19-1232-JMC, 2019 WL 3323156, at *2 (D. Md. July 23, 2019) (noting that plaintiff alleged separate claims for “trespass to chattels” and “conversion”); Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d 548, 557 n.7 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that plaintiff “possessed viable state causes of action against [a state defendant] for negligence and conversion/trespass to chattels” after state euthanized plaintiffs dogs and cats).

The cases on which Geri-Care relies to argue that KeraLink has no property rights in the ocular tissue simply confirm what the Anatomical Gift Act already instructs- property rights in tissue, body parts, or material once contained within the human body may be limited in various ways, but they nonetheless exist. For example, a number of courts have precluded plaintiffs from maintaining common law conversion claims against hospitals or organ donation networks for retaining organs or tissue in which the plaintiffs claimed an interest, see Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network, Inc., 356 F.Supp.2d 237, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd in part, question certified, 438 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2006), certified question answered, 8 N.Y.3d 43 (2006), and aff'd, 486 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2007); Moore v. Regents of Univ. of California, 51 Cal.3d 120, 142-147 (1990);cf United States v. Arora, 860 F.Supp. 1091, 1099 (D. Md. 1994), aff'd, 56 F.3d 62 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the physical destruction of a new cell line used for research may support a conversion claim by the researcher who created the cells). As the California Supreme Court observed in Moore, the trend against the recognition of such conversion claims is not “surprising, since [state] laws governing such things as human tissues, . . . [including] corneal tissue, . . . deal with human biological materials as objects sui generis, regulating their disposition to achieve policy goals rather than abandoning them to the general law of personal property.” Moore, 51 Cal.3d at 137 (footnotes omitted).