In United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499 (7th Cir. 2009), the court of appeals relied on Edwards to conclude that the defendant's statement was properly admitted. Agents went to the defendant's home to execute an arrest warrant.

The Court denied Defendant's motion to suppress. First, relying on United States v. Hernandez, 751 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 2014) and United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 506 (7th Cir. 2009), the Court found that the agents' questions regarding the presence and whereabouts of weapons—made while Defendant was in custody but prior to any Miranda warning—were appropriate under Miranda's public-safety exception. Second, the Court found that Defendant's alleged intoxication was insufficient to show that his waiver of his Miranda rights was involuntary, both because Defendant failed to show any accompanying coercion on the part of the agents and because Defendant's conclusory allegations of intoxication were legally insufficient.

United States v. Bland , 517 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Silva , 71 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1995)). See also United States v. Payne , 102 F.3d 289, 293 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Baker , 453 F.3d 419, 422 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Palivos , 486 F.3d 250, 255 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Are , 590 F.3d 499, 510 (7th Cir. 2009). The evidence is considered suppressed if "(1) the prosecution failed to disclose the evidence before it was too late for the defendant to make use of the evidence, and (2) the evidence was not otherwise available to the defendant through the exercise of reasonable diligence."

Also, CI-1's statement that Garza was acting as a lookout during the drug purchase at the Omega Restaurant, which indicates that Nunez lied to the government when he stated that Garza was at the scene solely to help transport lawn furniture, is corroborated by the fact that Garza parked his car across the street from the parking lot in which Nunez met with the government informant to transfer the drugs, in a place where he had a direct view of Nunez. At least the portions of CI-1's statement that were corroborated had "sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy." Hankton, 432 F.3d at 790; see also Mays, 593 F.3d at 608-09; United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 521-23 (7th Cir. 2009); Martinez, 289 F.3d at 1029; United States v. Morrison, 207 F.3d 962, 967-69 (7th Cir. 2000). Arguably, then, the district court did not err by relying on CI-1's statement.

In United States v. Are, officers executed an arrest warrant at the home of Antwan Daniels, who was wanted on drug conspiracy charges and had several prior drug- and weapons-related arrests. 590 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2009). After the arrest team had conducted a protective sweep, handcuffed Davis, and gathered the other occupants of the home in a single room, officers asked the Daniels "whether there were any weapons in the house, to which he replied that there was an AK-47 under the dresser in the bedroom.

Napue stands for the proposition that prosecutors may not suborn perjury, and holds that a defendant's due-process rights are violated when the government obtains a conviction through the knowing use of false testimony. See 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173 ; United States v. Are , 590 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Holt , 486 F.3d 997, 1003 (7th Cir. 2007) ). Hilliard's Napue claim fails for the reasons already discussed. Any initial confusion in Agent Labno's testimony was cleared up through later questioning, and Labno's responses explained the limits of the report's content.

The narrow approach would not. Compare United States v. Liddell, 517 F.3d 1007, 1008 (8th Cir.2008) (asking “is there anything else in there we need to know about?” “That's gonna hurt us?” while searching secured suspect's vehicle fell within the exception) with United States v. Williams, 483 F.3d 425, 428 (6th Cir.2007) (requiring, as the second part of a formal two-prong test, “that someone other than police might gain access to that weapon and inflict harm with it.” (emphasis added)). This circuit has cited the Eight Circuit's approach approvingly, United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 506 (7th Cir.2009) (citing United States v. Williams, 181 F.3d 945, 953–54 (8th Cir.1999)), but we have not had to decide whether we agreed entirely, because in Are there was a risk of the suspect or others who were there obtaining any weapon that was hidden on the premises. Id. at 506.

This Court has held that experts may testify as to the way drug dealers operate and to the meaning of code words dealers use as long as the testimony is based on their expert opinion and not on the defendant's specific mental processes. United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 512–13 (7th Cir.2009); United States v. Avila, 557 F.3d 809, 820 (7th Cir.2009); United States v. Ceballos, 302 F.3d 679, 687–88 (7th Cir.2002). In United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1243 (7th Cir.1994), for example, we upheld the district court's admission of expert testimony because officers testified that their opinions were based on their knowledge of “common practices in the drug trade” and not on “some special familiarity with the workings of Lipscomb's mind.”

Although Anobah objected substantively to the application of the two-level sophisticated means enhancement, he did not object below to the court's use of information from other sentencing hearings. He has therefore forfeited that objection and we review it for plain error. United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 523–24 (7th Cir.2009). Anobah was aware that the government was seeking the sophisticated means enhancement and that the foreseeable relevant conduct of his co-schemers was at issue.

Collins contends that Officer Coleman's testimony went directly to his “intent and knowledge” and, thus, deprived him of a fair trial. But cutting to the core of Collins' argument, we do not see how Officer Coleman's testimony is any different from the expert testimony we upheld in many cases like this one. See, e.g., United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 512–14 (7th Cir.2009) (upholding the admission of “coded language” testimony because the expert officer “testified based on his experience and training in wiretap and drug trafficking investigations ... that he was familiar with the language and words that ‘drug dealers' use ... [,] that he had not interviewed any witness in relation to the case on trial,” and that he “had no knowledge of the facts of the case or the allegations against the defendants.”). As in Are, Officer Coleman was testifying based on his knowledge of “common practices in the drug trade” and not on “some special familiarity with the workings of [Collins'] mind.” See United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1241–42 (7th Cir.1994); see also Are, 590 F.3d at 512–13 (comparing Officer Coleman's testimony to the expert testimony in Lipscomb ).