This disposition does not, therefore, resemble cases in which courts have found diversion within the meaning of § 4A1.2(f) on the ground that the adjudication was somehow withheld, stayed, or deferred. See Morillo, 178 F.3d at 20; see also United States v. Amster, 193 F.3d 779, 779-80 (3d Cir. 1999) (diversionary disposition where defendant pled nolo contendere, "adjudication was withheld," and case was dismissed after defendant complied with certain conditions); United States v. Bagheri, 999 F.2d 80, 82-83 (4th Cir. 1993) (diversionary disposition where court imposed "probation without entry of judgment"); United States v. Rockman, 993 F.2d 811, 812-14 (11th Cir. 1993) (diversionary disposition where defendant pled nolo contendere and "the state court withheld adjudication of guilt"); United States v. Frank, 932 F.2d 700, 701 (8th Cir. 1991) (diversionary disposition where defendant pled guilty and "the state court stayed the adjudication" and imposed probation). DiPina argues that he was found "delinquent" in the heroin disposition, which is not the same as finding that he committed the crime.

Further, under § 4A1.2(f) diversionary dispositions resulting from a plea of nolo are counted, even if a conviction is not formally entered. See e.g., U.S. v. Valdez-Valdez, 143 F. 3d 196 (5th Cir. 1998) (deferred adjudication was a prior sentence for purposes of computing criminal history) ; U.S. v. Amster, 193 F.3d 779 (3rd Cir. 1999) (analyzing 4A1.2(f), the court found that a diversionary disposition resulting from a plea of nolo contendere in a judicial proceeding, in which the charges were eventually dismissed is counted). Likewise, under § 4A1.2(l), sentences that are on appeal are counted.