We have held that the district court's interpretation of that guideline is correct. United States v. Alves, 873 F.2d 495, 498 (1st Cir. 1989). Subsequently, on May 17, 1989, the Sentencing Commission promulgated Amendment 266, and sent it to Congress for review.
See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(c)(2) (establishing a criminal history category of VI where the defendant "used . . . the firearm or ammunition in connection with a crime of violence"). Courts have held that the adjustments in Chapter 3 of the Guidelines are generally inapplicable to the offense levels set by the career offender and armed career criminal provisions. See United States v. Thomas, 894 F.2d 996, 997 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cruz, 882 F.2d 922, 924-26 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 713-14 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Alves, 873 F.2d 495, 497-98 (1st Cir. 1989). Exceptions to this rule are specifically noted in the Guidelines.
The United States also urges us to adopt the ruling of several other circuits which states that sentencing courts cannot give credit for acceptance of responsibility when a defendant is found to be a career offender. See United States v. Summers, 895 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Reyes, 881 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Alves, 873 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Huff, 873 F.2d 709 (3d Cir. 1989). We need not reach this issue in this case, however, because Graham did not question whether individuals sentenced as career offenders could be given credit for acceptance of responsibility.
These courts have found that the two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility does not apply to the career offender section. See United States v. Cruz, 882 F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Alves, 873 F.2d 495, 498 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 713 (3d Cir. 1989). We agree with those circuits' interpretation of the Guidelines.
Several circuits have held that a career offender may not receive a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. See United States v. Cruz, 882 F.2d 922, 924-26 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Reyes, 881 F.2d 155, 157 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 713 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Alves, 873 F.2d 495, 497 (1st Cir. 1989). We agree with the holdings in these cases and, accordingly, agree with the District Court that the resolution of this factual issue was irrelevant to Thomas's sentence.
But where the career-criminal offense level exceeds the total offense level otherwise applicable, the former controls. See Guideline § 4B1.1; see generally United States v. Alves, 873 F.2d 495, 497 (1st Cir. 1989). That is the situation here.
Although this is a question of first impression in our circuit, both the First and Third Circuits have recently concluded that the Guidelines do not provide for a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility from the sentencing levels set for career offenders. See United States v. Alves, 873 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Huff, 873 F.2d 709 (3d Cir. 1989). We agree.
In our holding that the offense level of a career offender is not eligible for a level reduction under § 3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility), we find support in the decisions of other circuits. See United States v. Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 713-14 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Alves, 873 F.2d 495, 497-98 (1st Cir. 1989). AFFIRMED.
Second, the few courts to confront such situations have adopted this approach without discussion. See United States v. Alves, 873 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Lawrence, 708 F. Supp. 461 (D.P.R. 1989). Third, ambiguities in penal statutes generally are to be resolved in favor of leniency.