United States v. Fusero, 106 F.Supp.2d 921, 927 (E.D. Mich. 2000). “[I]n criminal tax cases, ‘the statutory willfulness requirement is the voluntary, intentional violation of a known duty.'” United States v. Aaron, 590 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991)). “The showing of willfulness can be negated by ‘a defendant's claim of ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the law, he had a good-faith belief that he was not violating any of the provisions of the tax laws.

Under the plain error standard, we will reverse only if the district court abused its discretion and "the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings." Semrau, 693 F.3d at 528 (quoting United States v. Aaron, 590 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). On appeal, Overton objects to the following portion of the district court's instruction on the third element of carjacking: "The government does not have to prove that the defendant's behavior caused or could have caused terror or panic, but it must show that an ordinary person would have feared bodily harm because of the defendant's behavior."

Under the plain error standard, we will reverse only if the district court abused its discretion and "the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings." Semrau, 693 F.3d at 528 (quoting United States v. Aaron, 590 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). On appeal, Overton objects to the following portion of the district court's instruction on the third element of carjacking: "The government does not have to prove that the defendant's behavior caused or could have caused terror or panic, but it must show that an ordinary person would have feared bodily harm because of the defendant's behavior."

To demonstrate plain error, defendants must show: "1) an error 2) that is plain and 3) that seriously affects [their] fundamental rights." United States v. Balark, 412 F. App'x 810, 814 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Aaron, 590 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2009)). If defendant satisfies these requirements, the court "has discretion to 'correct the error only if the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.'" Id.

"The defendant's belief or misunderstanding need not be objectively reasonable, and whether it was held in good faith should be determined by the fact-finder." United States v. Aaron, 590 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202-03). Thus, "[t]he Supreme Court [in Cheek, 498 U.S. at 203-04,] left to the jury the decision of whether a defendant was willful and whether the professed belief was so unreasonable that it was unlikely the defendant truly believed it."

Further, any error must have "seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings." United States v. Aaron, 590 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). Because the jury concluded that the defendants bore no liability whatsoever, it is evident that no prejudice resulted from the damages instruction given.

"If he satisfies these conditions, this court has discretion to correct the error only if the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings." United States v. Aaron, 590 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2009). Poandl's indictment charged: "On or about August 3, 1991, the defendant . . . knowingly transported . . . DH, a ten year old boy, in interstate commerce with the intent that such individual engage in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense."

Taylor has made no showing that a properly instructed jury would have found that he believed in good faith that it was legal for him to lie to the IRS about an important matter—that is, to file tax returns with the IRS that he subjectively believed were materially false. See United States v. Aaron, 590 F.3d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that a district court is not required to define the concept of willfulness and declining to find plain error where the defendant did not show that the district court's failure to define willfulness affected his conviction under § 7206(1)). See also United States v. Griffin, 524 F.3d 71, 78 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that there is very little daylight between a proposed instruction that the defendant "had to know that her statements [to the IRS] were false" and an instruction that the defendant intentionally violated a known legal duty under the tax code); United States v. Vartanian, 223 F. App'x 662, 664 (9th Cir. 2007) (declining to find plain error where a defendant was convicted of § 7206(1) despite a lack of a willfulness instruction because "it is extremely unlikely that a properly instructed jury would not have convicted" the defendant anyway (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Because Harmon undisputedly failed to object to the instructions at trial, we review the jury instructions only for plain error. United States v. Aaron, 590 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Vasquez, 560 F.3d 461, 470 (6th Cir. 2009)). To demonstrate plain error, Harmon must show: "(1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects his fundamental rights."

When the defendant, however, fails to object to the jury instructions during trial, we review the jury instruction for plain error. United States v. Aaron, 590 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2009). 1. FRE 404(b) Evidence Instructions