Opinion
ORDER
VAUGHN WALKER, District Judge.
The government moves the court for default judgment or alternatively for summary judgment in this civil forfeiture action. Doc # 46. Because the court finds this matter suitable for determination without oral argument, the hearing scheduled for August 12, 2004, is VACATED. See Civ LR 7-1(b). For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS the government's motion for summary judgment.
I
John Barkley pled guilty to manufacturing marijuana in violation of 21 USC § 841(a)(1) and money laundering in violation of 18 USC § 1957(a). Hinds Dec (Doc #47), Exh A at 1. Kuntida Barkley pled guilty to structuring financial transactions in violation of 31 USC § 5324(a)(3). Hinds Dec, Exh B at 1. These statutory violations allowed the government to pursue forfeiture of properties sufficiently connected to the violations. See 21 USC § 881(a)(6)-(7); 18 USC § 981. The Barkleys agreed to forfeit their interests in the following real property: (1) 4338 Snyder Lane, Santa Rosa, California (the "Snyder Lane" parcel); (2) Upper Mattole Canyon Road, Ettersburg, California, identified by Humboldt County Assessor's Parcel Numbers XXX-XXX-XX and XXX-XXX-XX (the "Upper Mattole" parcels); and (3) 4500 Goodman Ranch Road, Ettersburg California, identified by Humboldt County Assessor's Parcel Number XXX-XXX-XX (the "Goodman Ranch" parcel). See Hinds Dec, Exh A at 4; Hinds Dec, Exh B at 3. Subsequently, the government learned that Paul and Emma Silacci held a promissory note on the Snyder Lane parcel and had commenced foreclosure proceedings. The sale resulted in a surplus of $65,537.35.
Unexpectedly, John and Kuntida Barkley filed a claim, in pro per, contesting the forfeiture proceeding as to each of the properties. See Doc # 13. Upon advice of counsel, the Barkleys withdrew their claim by signed waiver dated November 10, 2003. Hinds Dec, Exh H. Mary and Joseph Shepp filed verified claims contesting the forfeiture proceeding as to only the Goodman Ranch parcel. See Doc ## 17, 18. On November 21, 2003, the government moved for default judgment asserting that the Barkleys' interests in the surplus and defendant real properties were forfeited to the United States.
The court denied the government's default judgment motion for two reasons. 1/15/04 Ord (Doc #42) at 3. First, the clerk had never entered default pursuant to Admiralty Local Rule (Admir LR) 6-2; accordingly, the court could not grant default judgment if default had not been entered. Id . The court noted that it would not have been proper for the clerk to enter default in any event, based upon the then-existing claims of the Barkleys and the Shepps.
Second, the court refused to forfeit the Barkleys' interest in the Goodman Ranch parcel without the government identifying the exact extent of that interest. The government had only stated that the Barkleys possessed a "minority interest" in the property. Id at 4.
Subsequent to the court's denial, the government and the Shepps reached a settlement resolving the Shepps' interest in the Goodman Ranch parcel. The settlement stipulations also describe, with particularity, that Kuntida Barkley owns an undivided two-fifths interest in the Goodman Ranch property. Docs ##43, 44.
Based upon these recent developments, the government has filed again for a default judgment or alternatively for summary judgment. Neither John nor Kuntida Barkley has filed an answer in this action. Hinds Dec at 4.
II
A
The Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims (Supp Rules) govern in rem forfeiture proceedings. United States v Real Property at 2659 Roundhill Drive , 283 F.3d 1146, 1149 n2 (9th Cir 2002). Under the admiralty local rules, default may be entered upon a showing that:
(a) Notice has been given as required by Admir. L.R. 6-1;
(b) The time to answer has expired, and
(c) No one has appeared to claim the property.
Admir LR 6-2. Default judgment may be entered in accordance with FRCP 55(b) any time after default has been entered. Id.
Default judgment is still not proper in this case. Unlike the situation that existed when the government first filed for default judgment, neither the Barkleys nor the Shepps are presently "claim[ing] the property." Admir LR 6-2. But the clerk has still not entered default. Accordingly, under Admir LR 6-2, the court cannot grant default judgment because default has not been entered.
B
Alternatively, the government moves for the court to enter summary judgment against the Barkleys forfeiting their interest in the $65,537.35 in surplus and defendant real properties.
In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court must determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist, resolving any doubt in favor of the non-moving party. If no genuine issues of material fact exist, then the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See United States v $42,500 U.S. Currency, 283 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir 2002).
In order for the government to prevail in a civil forfeiture case, it must "establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture." 18 USC §983(c)(1). If the theory of forfeiture is that the "property was used to commit or facilitate the commission of" a crime, the government meets its §983(c)(1) burden by "establishing a substantial connection between the propert[ies] and the offense." 18 USC §983(c)(3).
In this case, it is undisputed that the Barkleys have been convicted for illegal drug activities. Hinds Dec, Exhs A, B. It is also undisputed that law enforcement officers discovered an active marijuana cultivation operation on the Goodman Ranch parcel. Hinds Dec, Exh C at 3. Additionally, officers found marijuana packaged for sale and over $40,000 at the Snyder Lane parcel. Id . Finally, the Barkleys admitted in their plea agreements that the Upper Mattole properties were "traceable and derived from the proceeds of the illegal sale of narcotics." Hinds Dec, Exh A at 4; Hinds Dec, Exh B at 3.
The government has provided undisputed facts showing a substantial connection between the defendant properties and the Barkleys' offenses as required by §983(c)(3). This connection being shown, the government has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant properties are subject to forfeiture as required by §983(c)(1). Because no genuine issue of material fact exists, the government is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its forfeiture claim.
III
Accordingly, the court GRANTS the government's motion for summary judgment (Doc # 46) and DENIES the government's motion for default judgment (Doc #46). The court also VACATES the August 12, 2004, hearing on these motions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.