See, e.g., Bufco Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 147 F.3d 964 (D.C.Cir.1998) (labor); Valley Finance, Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 162 (D.C.Cir.1980) (tax); Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d 743 (D.C.Cir.1975) (administrative law); United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Science and Engineering, Inc., 191 F.Supp.2d 17, 20 (D.D.C.2002) (False Claims Act); United States v. BCCI Holdings, 977 F.Supp. 27, 29 (D.D.C.1997) (criminal forfeiture). “Although the law of the state where a corporation is incorporated ... normally dictates whether the corporate veil should be pierced, federal common law governing the veil-piercing question is applicable to cases where ‘some federal interest is implicated by the veil-piercing inquiry.’ ” United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Science and Engineering, Inc., 191 F.Supp.2d at 20 (quoting United States Through the Small Bus. Admin. v. Trotter, 731 F.2d 8, 12 (D.C.Cir.1984)). Situations involving a “federal interest” include those where the federal government has a financial stake in the outcome.
Where a veil-piercing case is brought under a federal statute, "[t]here is significant disagreement . . . over whether . . . courts should borrow state law, or instead apply a federal common law of veil piercing." United States v. Best Foods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 n. 9 (1998); see also U.S. Through Small Business Admin. v. Pena, 731 F.2d 8, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (addressing the veil-piercing choice-of-law quandary). Diversity cases "involv[ing] situations in which [a] federal interest [is] implicated by the decision whether to pierce the corporate veil" present the same obstacle.Id.; see also United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Science and Engineering, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 17, 20 (D.D.C. 2002) ("[F]ederal common law governing the veil-piercing question is applicable to [diversity] cases where `some federal interest is implicated by the veil-piercing inquiry.'") (quoting Pena, 731 F.2d at 12) (internal citation omitted); Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 853 (1982) (discussing, inter alia, diversity cases where courts have applied federal veil-piercing common law).
Where a veil-piercing case is brought under a federal statute, “[t]here is significant disagreement ... over whether ... courts should borrow state law, or instead apply a federal common law of veil piercing.” United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 n. 9, 118 S.Ct. 1876, 141 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998); see also U.S. Through Small Business Admin. v. Pena, 731 F.2d 8, 12 (D.C.Cir.1984) (addressing the veil-piercing choice-of-law quandary). Diversity cases “involv[ing] situations in which [a] federal interest [is] implicated by the decision whether to pierce the corporate veil” present the same obstacle.
Other courts have held that federal common law governs alter-ego theories "when a federal interest is implicated by the decision of whether to pierce the corporate veil." Anwar, 876 F.3d at 848-49 (applying federal common law to an alter ego personal jurisdiction claim); see also United States ex rel. Small Bus. Admin. v. Pena, 731 F.2d 8, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that "courts ha[ve] both a jurisdictional and substantive basis for resorting to a federal common law of veil-piercing" when "some federal interest [i]s implicated by the decision whether to pierce the corporate veil"). The plaintiffs have not pleaded facts sufficient to pierce the corporate veil under English law.
Other courts have held that federal common law governs alter-ego theories "when a federal interest is implicated by the decision of whether to pierce the corporate veil." Anwar, 876 F.3d at 848-49 (applying federal common law to an alter ego personal jurisdiction claim); see also United States ex rel. Small Bus. Admin. v. Pena, 731 F.2d 8, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that "courts ha[ve] both a jurisdictional and substantive basis for resorting to a federal common law of veil piercing" when "some federal interest [i]s implicated by the decision whether to pierce the corporate veil").
For instance, building on the statement in Gibbs that "[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity" and to provide the parties with "a surer-footed reading of applicable law," Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139, some courts found it appropriate to decline pendent jurisdiction when the comity concerns embodied in abstention doctrines were implicated. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Small Business Admin. v. Pena, 731 F.2d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Moreover, even when Gibbs has no application, pendent jurisdiction should sometimes be declined when local law issues are unsettled, complex, or novel."); see also Jones v. Fitch, 665 F.2d 586, 593 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982) (approving a remand of pendent state law claims in part because of "the existence of an issue of state constitutional law not previously addressed by the state supreme court"); Metzger, 680 F.2d at 776 ("[A] federal court should be reluctant to retain pendent jurisdiction over a question for which state jurisprudence gives inadequate guidance."); Gingerich v. White Pigeon Community Schs., 736 F. Supp. 147, 149-51 (W.D.Mich. 1990) ("When novel issues of state law are presented, though, considerations of judicial economy are not determinative.").
As the district court was prepared to hear the federal claim, judicial economy and convenience argue most strongly for reaching the pendent claim as well. There may be cases in which the local law issue is so important and so unsettled that the district court must decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction even though it decides the federal claim for the plaintiff. Cf. Grano v. Berry, 733 F.2d 164, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States ex rel. Small Bus. Admin. v. Pena, 731 F.2d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("even when Gibbs has no application, pendent jurisdiction should sometimes be declined when local law issues are unsettled, complex, or novel"); Doe v. Board on Professional Responsibility, 717 F.2d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1983). This is not such a case.
The parties agree that Indonesian law governs whether EMC can be held vicariously liable for EMOI's actions. See Defs.' Mem. 35 n.29; Pls.' Opp'n 46-49; see also United States ex rel. Small Bus. Admin, v. Pena, 731 F.2d 8, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Vicarious liability is governed by Indonesian Civil Code Article 1367.
“Where a veil-piercing case is brought under a federal statute, ‘[t]here is significant disagreement . . . over whether . . . courts should borrow state law, or instead apply a federal common law of veil piercing.'” TAC-Critical Sys., Inc. v. Integrated Facility Sys., Inc., 808 F.Supp.2d 60, 64 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 n.9 (1998)). “Diversity cases ‘involv[ing] situations in which [a] federal interest [is] implicated by the decision whether to pierce the corporate veil' present the same obstacle.” Id. (alterations in original) (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Small Bus. Admin. v. Pena, 731 F.2d 8, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
original) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Small Bus. Admin. v. Pena, 731 F.2d 8, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).