U.S. Through Small Business Admin. v. Pena

34 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Emor

    850 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2012)   Cited 25 times
    Finding corporation was alter ego of dominant shareholder in part because board was "particularly nominal," did not meet annually, and no evidence "was brought to the Court's attention in which anyone from [the corporation] or its Board said no to one of [the dominant shareholder's] proposals or questioned his use of ... funds"

    See, e.g., Bufco Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 147 F.3d 964 (D.C.Cir.1998) (labor); Valley Finance, Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 162 (D.C.Cir.1980) (tax); Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d 743 (D.C.Cir.1975) (administrative law); United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Science and Engineering, Inc., 191 F.Supp.2d 17, 20 (D.D.C.2002) (False Claims Act); United States v. BCCI Holdings, 977 F.Supp. 27, 29 (D.D.C.1997) (criminal forfeiture). “Although the law of the state where a corporation is incorporated ... normally dictates whether the corporate veil should be pierced, federal common law governing the veil-piercing question is applicable to cases where ‘some federal interest is implicated by the veil-piercing inquiry.’ ” United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Science and Engineering, Inc., 191 F.Supp.2d at 20 (quoting United States Through the Small Bus. Admin. v. Trotter, 731 F.2d 8, 12 (D.C.Cir.1984)). Situations involving a “federal interest” include those where the federal government has a financial stake in the outcome.

  2. Tac-Critical Systems, Inc. v. Integrated Facility Systems

    Civil Action No. 09-1512 (JEB) (D.D.C. Sep. 2, 2011)

    Where a veil-piercing case is brought under a federal statute, "[t]here is significant disagreement . . . over whether . . . courts should borrow state law, or instead apply a federal common law of veil piercing." United States v. Best Foods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 n. 9 (1998); see also U.S. Through Small Business Admin. v. Pena, 731 F.2d 8, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (addressing the veil-piercing choice-of-law quandary). Diversity cases "involv[ing] situations in which [a] federal interest [is] implicated by the decision whether to pierce the corporate veil" present the same obstacle.Id.; see also United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Science and Engineering, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 17, 20 (D.D.C. 2002) ("[F]ederal common law governing the veil-piercing question is applicable to [diversity] cases where `some federal interest is implicated by the veil-piercing inquiry.'") (quoting Pena, 731 F.2d at 12) (internal citation omitted); Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 853 (1982) (discussing, inter alia, diversity cases where courts have applied federal veil-piercing common law).

  3. Tac-Critical Systems, Inc. v. Integrated Facility Systems, Inc.

    808 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.D.C. 2011)   Cited 22 times
    Finding uncertain whether defendants followed corporate formalities where questions remained about corporate recordkeeping

    Where a veil-piercing case is brought under a federal statute, “[t]here is significant disagreement ... over whether ... courts should borrow state law, or instead apply a federal common law of veil piercing.” United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 n. 9, 118 S.Ct. 1876, 141 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998); see also U.S. Through Small Business Admin. v. Pena, 731 F.2d 8, 12 (D.C.Cir.1984) (addressing the veil-piercing choice-of-law quandary). Diversity cases “involv[ing] situations in which [a] federal interest [is] implicated by the decision whether to pierce the corporate veil” present the same obstacle.

  4. KPFF Inv., Inc. v. BASF Metals Ltd. (In re Platinum & Palladium Antitrust Litig.)

    61 F.4th 242 (2d Cir. 2023)   Cited 47 times
    Exercising conspiracy jurisdiction under federal statutes and thus the Fifth Amendment

    Other courts have held that federal common law governs alter-ego theories "when a federal interest is implicated by the decision of whether to pierce the corporate veil." Anwar, 876 F.3d at 848-49 (applying federal common law to an alter ego personal jurisdiction claim); see also United States ex rel. Small Bus. Admin. v. Pena, 731 F.2d 8, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that "courts ha[ve] both a jurisdictional and substantive basis for resorting to a federal common law of veil-piercing" when "some federal interest [i]s implicated by the decision whether to pierce the corporate veil"). The plaintiffs have not pleaded facts sufficient to pierce the corporate veil under English law.

  5. In re Platinum & Palladium Antitrust Litig.

    No. 20-1458 (2d Cir. Feb. 27, 2023)   Cited 7 times

    Other courts have held that federal common law governs alter-ego theories "when a federal interest is implicated by the decision of whether to pierce the corporate veil." Anwar, 876 F.3d at 848-49 (applying federal common law to an alter ego personal jurisdiction claim); see also United States ex rel. Small Bus. Admin. v. Pena, 731 F.2d 8, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that "courts ha[ve] both a jurisdictional and substantive basis for resorting to a federal common law of veil piercing" when "some federal interest [i]s implicated by the decision whether to pierce the corporate veil").

  6. Executive Software v. U.S. Dist. Court

    24 F.3d 1545 (9th Cir. 1994)   Cited 523 times
    Holding that supplemental jurisdiction must be asserted if permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1367 unless an exception in § 1367(c) applies

    For instance, building on the statement in Gibbs that "[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity" and to provide the parties with "a surer-footed reading of applicable law," Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139, some courts found it appropriate to decline pendent jurisdiction when the comity concerns embodied in abstention doctrines were implicated. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Small Business Admin. v. Pena, 731 F.2d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Moreover, even when Gibbs has no application, pendent jurisdiction should sometimes be declined when local law issues are unsettled, complex, or novel."); see also Jones v. Fitch, 665 F.2d 586, 593 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982) (approving a remand of pendent state law claims in part because of "the existence of an issue of state constitutional law not previously addressed by the state supreme court"); Metzger, 680 F.2d at 776 ("[A] federal court should be reluctant to retain pendent jurisdiction over a question for which state jurisprudence gives inadequate guidance."); Gingerich v. White Pigeon Community Schs., 736 F. Supp. 147, 149-51 (W.D.Mich. 1990) ("When novel issues of state law are presented, though, considerations of judicial economy are not determinative.").

  7. District of Columbia Common Cause v. District of Columbia

    858 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1988)   Cited 52 times
    Holding that municipal taxpayers had standing to challenge “expenditures by the District of Columbia government to influence the outcome of an initiative,” and affirming district court's finding that such expenditures were illegal on statutory and federal constitutional grounds

    As the district court was prepared to hear the federal claim, judicial economy and convenience argue most strongly for reaching the pendent claim as well. There may be cases in which the local law issue is so important and so unsettled that the district court must decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction even though it decides the federal claim for the plaintiff. Cf. Grano v. Berry, 733 F.2d 164, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States ex rel. Small Bus. Admin. v. Pena, 731 F.2d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("even when Gibbs has no application, pendent jurisdiction should sometimes be declined when local law issues are unsettled, complex, or novel"); Doe v. Board on Professional Responsibility, 717 F.2d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1983). This is not such a case.

  8. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.

    1:01-cv-1357-RCL (D.D.C. Jul. 22, 2022)

    The parties agree that Indonesian law governs whether EMC can be held vicariously liable for EMOI's actions. See Defs.' Mem. 35 n.29; Pls.' Opp'n 46-49; see also United States ex rel. Small Bus. Admin, v. Pena, 731 F.2d 8, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Vicarious liability is governed by Indonesian Civil Code Article 1367.

  9. M3 USA Corp. v. Qamoum

    Civil Action No. 20-2903 (RDM) (D.D.C. Jun. 7, 2021)   Cited 4 times
    Opining that "[t]he question, then, is what the 'closely related' doctrine adds to the law"

    “Where a veil-piercing case is brought under a federal statute, ‘[t]here is significant disagreement . . . over whether . . . courts should borrow state law, or instead apply a federal common law of veil piercing.'” TAC-Critical Sys., Inc. v. Integrated Facility Sys., Inc., 808 F.Supp.2d 60, 64 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 n.9 (1998)). “Diversity cases ‘involv[ing] situations in which [a] federal interest [is] implicated by the decision whether to pierce the corporate veil' present the same obstacle.” Id. (alterations in original) (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Small Bus. Admin. v. Pena, 731 F.2d 8, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

  10. M3 U.S. Corp. v. Qamoum

    Civil Action No. 20-2903 (RDM) (D.D.C. Jun. 4, 2021)

    original) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Small Bus. Admin. v. Pena, 731 F.2d 8, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).