E. Conspiracy in Violation of the FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3)General civil conspiracy principles apply to conspiracy claims under the FCA. United States ex rel. Coppock v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 2003 WL 21730668, at *14 n.17 (N.D.Tex. July 22, 2003) (citing United States v. Murphy, 937 F.2d 1032, 1039 (6th Cir. 1991)). A claim for civil conspiracy is generally not viable without the commission of an underlying wrongful act [.]" (alteration in original).

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing count VII because secondary liability for conspiracy under § 3729(a)(3) cannot exist without a viable underlying claim. See Pencheng Si v. Laogai Research Found., 71 F.Supp.3d 73, 98 (D.D.C. 2014) ("[T]here can be no conspiracy to commit fraud in violation of the FCA if an underlying false claim has not been adequately alleged."); United States ex rel. Coppock v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 2003 WL 21730668 at *14 n.17 (N.D. Tex., July 22, 2003) (Fitzwater, J.). The FCA provides in § 3729(a)(3) that any person who "conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid . . . is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty[.

Further, Del-Jen argues that since the Relators failed to successfully allege an FCA violation, they cannot plead conspiracy to commit an FCA violation. Therefore, according to Del-Jen, the Relators' 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(C) claim for conspiracy should be dismissed. General civil conspiracy principles apply to conspiracy claims under the FCA. United States ex rel. Coppock v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 2003 WL 21730668, at *14 n.17 (N.D.Tex. July 22, 2003) (citing United States v. Murphy, 937 F.2d 1032, 1039 (6th Cir. 1991)). A claim for civil conspiracy is generally not viable without the commission of an underlying wrongful act [.]" (alteration in original).

General civil conspiracy principles apply to conspiracy claims under the False Claims Act. United States ex rel. Coppock v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 2003 WL 21730668, at 14 n.17 (N.D. Tex. July 22, 2003) (citing United States v. Murphy, 937 F.2d 1032, 1039 (6th Cir.1991)); United States v. ITT Educ. Servs., 284 F. Supp. 2d 487, 509 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (citing United States ex rel. Durcholz v. FKW, Inc., 189 F.3d 542, 546 n.3 (7th Cir. 1999)). "A claim for civil conspiracy is generally not viable without the commission of an underlying wrongful act[.

An "obligation" under the FCA means "an obligation sufficiently certain to give rise to an action of debt at common law." See United States ex rel. Coppock v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 2003 WL 21730668, at * 14 (N.D.Tex. July 23, 2003) (Fitzwater, J.) (quoting Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., 190 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir.1999)). Even accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations in the Complaint as true, and viewing them in the light most favorable to Williams, the Court is unable to ascertain any allegations pertaining to an improper reduction in Defendants' liability to the government, or that false statements were made to decrease an obligation.

An "obligation" under the FCA means "an obligation sufficiently certain to give rise to an action of debt at common law." See United States ex rel. Coppock v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 2003 WL 21730668, at * 14 (N.D. Tex. July 23, 2003) (Fitzwater, J.) (quoting Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., 190 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 1999)). As stated in Coppock:

However, as the Fifth Circuit previously recognized, under either implied or express certification theories, the certification must be a prerequisite to receive the government benefit in order to be legally false. United States ex rel. Coppock v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 2003 WL 21730668, at *11 (N.D.Tex. July 22, 2003); see United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding a claim under False Claims Act is "legally false" only where party affirmatively certifies compliance with statute or regulation as condition to receiving governmental payment or property). Relator fails to establish the first element that Defendants made a knowingly false certification of compliance with a statute or regulation.

As a threshold matter, Defendant contends that Relator's FCA claims must fail because she does not have direct and independent knowledge of the grant application process, and therefore, lacks the requisite basis of knowledge for an FCA claim. Judge Fitzwater addressed a similar issue in U.S. ex rel. Coppock v. Northrop Grumman Corp., No. 3:98-CV-2143-D, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12626 (N.D. Tex. July 22, 2003). There, the defendant sought to dismiss the relator's FCA claims, in part because the relator lacked direct and independent knowledge of the actual misrepresentations made to the government.