Under Illinois law, dismissal of a counterclaim accompanied by Supreme Court Rule 304(a) language is a final judgment. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Long, 215 Ill.App.3d 396, 158 Ill.Dec. 891, 574 N.E.2d 1284 (4th Dist. 1991); Deerfield Management Co. v. Ohio Farmers Insurance, 174 Ill.App.3d 837, 124 Ill.Dec. 423, 529 N.E.2d 243 (2d Dist. 1988); see Arachnid, Inc. v. Beall, 210 Ill.App.3d 1096, 155 Ill.Dec. 662, 569 N.E.2d 1273 (2d Dist. 1991) (dismissal of a counterclaim is final only if Supreme Court Rule 304(a) language is included in order). The January 1989 Order dismissed the Second State Counterclaim and contained the substance of Supreme Court Rule 304(a) language.

130 Ill. App.3d at 636. In Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. ex rel. Manley Ford, Inc. v. Long (1991), 215 Ill. App.3d 396, the Appellate Court, Fourth District, went a step further. In that case, Long got in an accident while test-driving a car owned by Manley Ford, arguably a business relationship.

Traffic was light, the speed was slow and the reins could be taken from the driver with relative ease." Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Long, 215 Ill.App.3d 396, 158 Ill.Dec. 891, 574 N.E.2d 1284, 1287 (1991). ¶ 21 Today, however, the realities of modern driving are such that a passenger cannot safely be an active participant under normal circumstances.

The court in Sheppard rested its holding on the dubious authority of Goldzier v. Poole, 82 Ill. App. 469 (1899). See Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. ex rel. Manley Ford, Inc. v. Long, 215 Ill. App. 3d 396, 400 (1991) (appellate court opinions dated before 1935 lack precedential value). Other jurisdictions have soundly criticized the rule adopted in Sheppard.

[Citations.] Failure to state a cause of action is not such an enumerated ground, but is instead a basis for a section 2-615 motion.'" AG Farms, Inc. v. American Premier Underwriters, Inc., 296 Ill. App. 3d 684, 688 (1998), quoting Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. ex. rel Manley Ford, Inc. v. Long, 215 Ill. App. 3d 396, 399 (1991). Confusing a section 2-615 motion to dismiss with a section 2-619 motion to dismiss may have "severe" consequences and "should not be countenanced" by trial judges.

Further as Barracks was decided prior to 1935, it is not binding upon this court and has no precedential value. Sklodowski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 358 Ill.App.3d 696, 701, 295 Ill.Dec. 38, 832 N.E.2d 189 (2005); Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. ex rel. Manley Ford, Inc. v. Long, 215 Ill.App.3d 396, 400, 158 Ill.Dec. 891, 574 N.E.2d 1284 (1991). The authorities relied upon by the District in its reply brief, including our supreme court's decision in Board of Education of Rockford School District No. 205 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 165 Ill.2d 80, 208 Ill.Dec. 313, 649 N.E.2d 369 (1995) (Rockford), and its interpretation of section 10(b) of the Act (115 ILCS 5/10(b) (West 2002)), which prohibits parties engaged in a CBA process from implementing any provision that is in violation of, inconsistent with, or in conflict with any state law, fare no better.

Further, as Barracks was decided prior to 1935, it is not binding upon this court and has no precedential value. Sklodowski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 358 Ill. App. 3d 696, 701, 832 N.E.2d 189 (2005); Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. ex rel. Manley Ford, Inc. v. Long, 215 Ill. App. 3d 396, 400, 574 N.E.2d 1284 (1991). The authorities relied upon by the District in its reply brief, including our supreme court's decision in Board of Education of Rockford School District No. 205 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 165 Ill. 2d 80, 649 N.E.2d 369 (1995), and its interpretation of section 10(b) of the Act ( 115 ILCS 5/10(b) (West 2002)), which prohibits parties engaged in a CBA process from implementing any provision that is in violation of, inconsistent with, or in conflict with any state law, fare no better.

Failure to state a cause of action is not grounds for a motion undersection 2-619, but is instead a basis for a motion under section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2002)). Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. ex rel. Manley Ford, Inc. v. Long, 215 Ill.App.3d 396, 399, 158 Ill.Dec. 891, 574 N.E.2d 1284 (1991). However, misdesignation of a motion to strike or dismiss is not necessarily fatal; we may treat the motion as having been brought under the correct section of the Code (Illinois Housing & Development Authority v. Sjostrom & Sons, Inc., 105 Ill.App.3d 247, 253, 61 Ill.Dec. 22, 433 N.E.2d 1350 (1982)), provided that the improper motion practice was not prejudicial to the plaintiff (Becker v. Zellner, 292 Ill.App.3d 116, 121, 226 Ill.Dec. 175, 684 N.E.2d 1378 (1997)).

Appellate court cases decided prior to 1935 are not binding authority and have no precedential value. See Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. ex rel. Manley Ford, Inc. v. Long, 215 Ill. App. 3d 396, 400, 574 N.E.2d 1284, 1286 (1991). A trespasser is one who enters upon the premises of another with neither permission nor invitation and intrudes for some purpose of his own or at his convenience or merely as an idler.

[Citations.] Failure to state a cause of action is not such an enumerated ground, but is instead a basis for a section 2-615 motion." Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. ex. rel Manley Ford, Inc. v. Long, 215 Ill. App.3d 396, 399, 574 N.E.2d 1284, 1286 (1991). Although both motions admit all well-pleaded facts of the complaint, "the legal sufficiency of the complaint is disputed in a section 2-615 motion, but admitted in a section 2-619 motion."