Opinion
No. 4:20-cr-318-P
2021-07-06
UNITED STATES of America, v. Eric Darius YOUNG.
Brandie Lou Wade, US Attorney's Office, Fort Worth, TX, for USA. Stephen Le Brocq, Le Brocq Law Firm PLLC, Carrollton, TX, Henry James Clark, Jr, Law Office of Henry J Clark Jr, Fort Worth, TX, for Eric Darius Young.
Brandie Lou Wade, US Attorney's Office, Fort Worth, TX, for USA.
Stephen Le Brocq, Le Brocq Law Firm PLLC, Carrollton, TX, Henry James Clark, Jr, Law Office of Henry J Clark Jr, Fort Worth, TX, for Eric Darius Young.
ORDER
Mark T. Pittman, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendant Eric Darius Young's Rule 29 Motion for Acquittal (ECF No. 139) and Rule 33 Motion for New Trial (ECF No. 140). Having considered the Motions, the Responses (ECF Nos. 143, 144), facts of this case, and applicable law, the Court finds that the Motions should be and are hereby DENIED.
BACKGROUND
In September 2020, a confidential source ("CS") reported to authorities that Mr. Young attempted to purchase multiple kilograms of cocaine. ECF No. 1 at 2–3. Unbeknownst to Mr. Young, the government and CS had begun a correspondence where Mr. Young and the CS would discuss a potential purchase of cocaine. Id. at 3. The deal fell through initially, but on or about September 16, 2020, Mr. Young informed the CS that he was willing to arrange a cocaine deal. Id. On September 17, 2020, authorities arrested Mr. Young and two others, Lindsay Lacy and Edward Lassiter, during a transaction with the CS. Id. at 4.
On September 18, 2020, the Government filed a criminal complaint against three defendants including Mr. Young. ECF No. 1. On November 12, 2020, Mr. Young was indicted for one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance. ECF No. 26. The case was initially scheduled for trial to take place on December 21, 2020. ECF No. 30. However, the Court granted Mr. Young's Motion to Continue (ECF No. 32) and continued the trial to March 29, 2021. ECF No. 34. The government subsequently filed a superseding indictment (ECF No. 35) , and Mr. Young retained new counsel (ECF No. 43). Mr. Young's new counsel filed a second Motion for Continuance. ECF No. 42. After receiving a response in opposition from the government (ECF No. 45) and conducting a hearing on the motion (ECF No. 47), the Court denied the second Motion for Continuance but permitted Mr. Young to file motions out of time. ECF No. 48. Indeed, the Court granted Mr. Young leave to file numerous motions. See, e.g. , ECF Nos. 58, 67.
The superseding indictment charged Mr. Young with two counts: Count One was for the offense of Conspiracy to Possess with the Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance ("conspiracy count"), and Count Two was for the offense of Attempt to Possess with the Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance ("possession count"). ECF No. 35.
Among these motions filed out of time, the Court twice granted Mr. Young leave to file two motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 66, 95).
One of the issues Mr. Young raised that became a point of dispute was the identity of the CS. Mr. Young sought the disclosure of the CS's identity and location, and the government opposed disclosure on the ground of the informant's privilege. See, e.g. , ECF Nos. 60, 61. The Friday before trial was scheduled, the Court considered arguments from both sides, as well as briefs (ECF Nos. 79, 81), regarding the importance of the identity of the CS. ECF No. 83. When it had become clear that the CS's involvement in Mr. Young's arrest was significant and that Mr. Young was asserting an entrapment defense to which he planned on testifying, the Court entered an order instructing the parties to submit certain evidence in camera and ex parte so that the Court could conduct the appropriate balancing test in accordance with applicable caselaw and determine if the CS's identity should be disclosed. ECF Nos. 78, 84. The Court also continued and reset the trial for May 3, 2021. ECF No. 84. After receiving said evidence and with the filing of Mr. Young's amended witness list, it became clear that the identity and location of the CS had become known to Mr. Young. Thus, the Court entered an order finding the issue of informer's privilege was moot and denying the government's motion in limine to preclude the identity and mention of the CS at trial. ECF No. 91.
On April 9, 2021, the Court issued a supplemental scheduling order that, inter alia , set a pretrial conference for April 30, 2021, and provided a deadline of April 23, 2021 for the parties to file amended witness and exhibit lists. ECF No. 92. On April 13, 2021, Mr. Young filed his Second Amended Witness List, which included Jamison Sargent and identified Sargent as a witness who may testify about Mr. Young's relationship with the Lassiter family, as well as Mr. Young's character, work history, and criminal history, and Sargent's relationship with Mr. Young. ECF No. 94. On April 28, 2021, Mr. Young filed an opposed Motion for Leave to allow Sargent to testify remotely. ECF No. 115. The sole reason for the request was because Sargent's wife was on bed rest due to a high-risk pregnancy. Id. The only statement regarding Sargent's testimony was that it was "relevant and material" to Mr. Young's defense. Id. The Court denied the motion on April 29, 2021, which would have provided Mr. Young at least five days to make arrangements for Sargent to testify in person. ECF No. 119.
The case proceeded to trial on May 3, 2021 and continued through May 5, 2021. ECF Nos. 131, 133, 137. The government's case-in-chief included live testimony from, inter alia , Miguel Mendoza (the CS), as well as Mr. Young's co-defendants, Edward Lassiter and Lindsay Lacy. ECF No. 131, 133. After the government rested, Mr. Young presented his defense, which included testimony from himself, his wife, his mother, and several character witnesses. ECF Nos. 133, 137. The defense rested without calling Sargent or attempting to call two officers who had apparently been subpoenaed to testify. Nor did the defense seek a contempt order against any witnesses for failing to appear. In total, the jury heard testimony from 11 witnesses, and 39 exhibits (26 for the government and 13 for Mr. Young) were admitted into evidence. After deliberation, the jury returned a verdict in which they found Mr. Young guilty on Count One and not guilty on Count Two of the superseding indictment. ECF No. 136. Mr. Young is scheduled to be sentenced on July 8, 2021. ECF No. 138.
Now before the Court is Mr. Young's Motion for New Trial (ECF No. 140) and Motion for Acquittal (ECF No. 139) and the government's responses thereto (ECF Nos. 144, 143). Having been fully briefed, the Motions are now ripe for review.
DISCUSSION
In his Motion for Acquittal, Mr. Young contends that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to secure a valid conviction in so far that a rational trier of fact could not convict Mr. Young beyond a reasonable doubt. Mot. Acq. at 16. Specifically, Mr. Young contends that the government has failed to overcome his entrapment defense. Id. That is, the government failed to show that (1) Mr. Young was not induced into the drug deal, and (2) Mr. Young had a predisposition to commit the offense before being approached by Mendoza. Id. Mr. Young argues that the evidence showed he was induced by Mendoza badgering him into the deal. Id. Mr. Young also cites his various character witnesses to counter that he had a predisposition to commit the offense. Id. at 17
In his Motion for New Trial, Mr. Young contends that the weight of the evidence preponderates against the verdict, arguing that the government has failed to present sufficient evidence to overcome his entrapment defense. Mot. New Trl. at 3. Mr. Young relies on testimony from both himself and his wife Jasmaine Jackson in support of his argument that Mendoza induced him into the cocaine deal. Id. Mr. Young also attempts to counter the government's evidence showing a predisposition to commit the offense by arguing that the testimony of key government witnesses Edward Lassiter and Detective Mark Rangel was either unreliable and/or did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt he was predisposed to commit the offense. Id. at 3–4. Finally, Mr. Young argues he suffered a miscarriage of justice because two subpoenaed officers did not testify to a supposed post-arrest statement from Mr. Young and because Sargent (a character witness as to Mr. Young and Lassiter) was not allowed to testify remotely. Id. at 4–5.
A. Entrapment
"When a defendant pleads entrapment, he is asserting that, although he had criminal intent, it was ‘the Government's deception [that implemented] the criminal design in the mind of the defendant.’ " Mathews v. United States , 485 U.S. 58, 62, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988) (citing United States v. Russell , 411 U.S. 423, 436, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973) ); see also United States v. Alexander , 681 F. App'x 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2017) ("The government may not ‘implant in an innocent person's mind the disposition to commit a criminal act, and then induce the commission of the crime so that the Government may prosecute.’ " (quoting Jacobson v. United States , 503 U.S. 540, 548, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 118 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992) )). Two related elements make up an entrapment defense: the government inducement of the crime, and a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in the criminal conduct. Mathews , 485 U.S. at 62, 108 S.Ct. 883. Inducement requires more than the government/government agent providing the defendant an opportunity to commit the crime. Sherman v. United States , 356 U.S. 369, 372, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958). Rather, government inducement can occur when a government agent persists in encouraging criminality after a defendant rejects overtures, the presence of persuasion or mild coercion, or pleas based on need, sympathy, or friendship. United States v. Macedo-Flores , 788 F.3d 181, 188 (5th Cir. 2015). The factors supporting predisposition include the defendant's eagerness to participate in the criminal transaction and a ready response to the government/government agent's offer. Id. at 187. A lack of predisposition can be demonstrated by a lack of prior interest or experience relating to the criminal significant hesitation or unwillingness or attempts to return the discussion to lawful conduct." Id.
B. Motion for Acquittal
1. Legal Standard
"A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict." United States v. Lucio , 428 F.3d 519, 522 (5th Cir. 2005). When addressing motions for acquittal, the Court reviews the evidence as well as all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. United States v. Johnson , 990 F.3d 392, 398 (5th Cir. 2021). The mere fact that evidence exists that contradicts evidence presented by the defense does not by itself render a guilty verdict improper. United States v. Bates , 850 F.3d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 2017). Conflict in the evidence must be resolved "in favor of the jury's verdict." Id. Rule 29 does not require that the Court exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. United States v. Loe , 262 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 2001). Courts uphold the verdict if a sound rational trier of fact could conclude from the evidence that the elements of the offense were established beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson , 990 F.3d at 398. In addition, it is not for the court to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. United States v. Sanchez , 961 F.2d 1169, 1173 (5th Cir. 1992). That duty remains with the jury/trier of fact. Id.
When an entrapment instruction is given to the jury and the jury rejects the defense, the defendant "faces a heavier burden than a defendant alleging error in a failure to instruct on entrapment." Alexander , 681 F. App'x at 395. In that case, the defendant must show that the jury irrationally concluded the defendant was not entrapped. Id. (citing United States v. Rodriguez , 43 F.3d 117, 126 (5th Cir. 1995) ). And when the defendant asserts that entrapment turned on witness credibility, the Court's task is to determine whether the evidence supporting the jury's verdict "was so tenuous that a conviction would be shocking." Id. (quoting United States v. Batiste , 275 F.3d 45 (5th Cir. 2001) ).
2. Analysis
After reviewing the motion, response, and record the Court rejects Mr. Young's assertion that he is entitled to an acquittal of his conviction. The government presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to convict Mr. Young beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court details some of this evidence below.
First , the Court will address Mr. Young's contention that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that he was not in fact induced into the drug deal. Mot. Acq. at 16. Mr. Young cites his own testimony and that of his wife, Mrs. Jackson, as evidence that he would not have done the deal but for the fact that Mr. Mendoza consistently called him. Id. at 16–17. This runs counter to evidence produced by the government which included numerous audio recordings, transcripts, and text messages that show a more mutual conversation. Govt.’s Resp. at 4–6. The jury saw a text message exchange between Mendoza and Mr. Young in which Mendoza asked Mr. Young if he knew anyone who needed "blow," and Mr. Young promptly responded by asking what was the price and if it was "locked up hard or like flour." Def.’s Exs. 2, 3. There was also a recorded and transcribed phone call in which Mr. Young tried to talk Mendoza out conducting the cocaine transaction in a public parking lot by stating, "[t]his ain't the way to do it brotha. This is not the way to do it." Govt.’s Ex. 4.
When reviewing a motion for acquittal, evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, and, where conflicts in the evidence presented exist, the conflict must be resolved in favor of the jury's verdict. Johnson , 990 F.3d at 398 ; see also Bates , 850 F.3d at 810. Viewing this evidence through the appropriate lens, the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Young was not induced into the drug deal and was instead a willing participant. Mr. Young's suggestions that Mendoza is not a reliable witness because he was a paid government agent and because he made inconsistent statements (Mot. Acq. at 17) is misplaced because as noted above, in a motion for acquittal, it is not for the court to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Sanchez , 961 F.2d at 1173.
Second , the Court will address Mr. Young's contention that the government failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove he had a predisposition to commit the offense before being approached by Mendoza. Mot. Acq. at 17. Mr. Young relies on his various character witnesses compared to the testimony of a single witness, Lassiter. Id. Again, it is not the Court's duty to assess the credibility of the witnesses and when there is conflicting evidence the Court must weigh on the side most favorable to the jury's verdict. Johnson , 990 F.3d at 398 ; see also, Bates, 850 F.3d at 810. It is within the jury's purview to believe or disbelieve testimony. United States v. Mora , 994 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th Cir. 1993). In this case the jury chose to believe Lassiter over the various character witnesses introduced by Mr. Young. Id. However, even if this Court could assess the credibility of Lassiter and determine his testimony was not credible, existing evidence is sufficient for the jury to determine Mr. Young was predisposed to commit the offense. That is, evidence presented by the government demonstrated that Mr. Young had knowledge of how a drug transaction works. Resp. Acq. at 5–6. In addition, Officer Mark Rangel's testimony provided further evidence to support the jury's conclusion. Id. Mr. Young contends that the substance Officer Rangel testified to seeing could be legal hemp while the Government contends that the testimony of Mr. Rangel provides further proof of predisposition. Mot. Acq. at 13, see also Resp. Acq. at 5–6. Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the jury's verdict. Johnson , 990 F.3d at 398. Thus, it was reasonable for the jury to find Mr. Young was predisposed to commit the crime. See Alexander , 681 F. App'x at 396 (affirming conviction for attempt to possess with intent to distribute oxycodone when jury was instructed on entrapment defense but rejected it because defendant "demonstrated knowledge of drug trafficking" by contacting partners and dealers and using slang terms).
Therefore, Mr. Young's Motion for Acquittal is hereby DENIED.
C. Motion for New Trial
1. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 provides that the Court may "vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires." United States v. Wright , 534 F.3d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 2011). While the Court "must not entirely usurp the jury's function," a motion for a new trial is unlike a motion for acquittal in which the Court should "assume that the evidence offered by the prosecution is true ... and weigh the evidence in a light most deferential to the verdict rendered by the jury." United States v. Fuchs , 467 F.3d 889, 909 (5th Cir. 2006), see also United States v. Herrera , 559 F.3d 296, 302 (5th Cir. 2009). Instead, in a motion for new trial, the trial court may weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses during its consideration of the motion for new trial. Fuchs , 467 F.3d at 902. In this Circuit, it is generally accepted that a new trial ordinarily should not be granted unless there would be a miscarriage of justice or the weight of evidence preponderates against the verdict which has an adverse effect on the substantial rights of a defendant. Wright , 534 F.3d at 775 (citing United States v. Wall , 389 F.3d 457, 466 (5th Cir. 2004) ). A defendant's substantial rights are violated if an error affects the outcome of the trial court proceedings. United States v. Slayton , No. 3:16-CR-40-DPJ-FKB, 2019 WL 3892426 at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 19, 2019). The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial. Fuchs , 467 F.3d at 909.
2. Analysis
a. The weight of the evidence did not support entrapment.
In this case, the Court must determine if the evidence presented preponderates heavily against the verdict. Wright , 534 F.3d at 775. It does not. Adequate evidence exists for a jury to reach a reasonable conclusion.
To overcome an entrapment defense, the government must prove that (1) Mr. Young was not induced to commit the offense by Mendoza (the government's confidential source) and (2) Mr. Young had a predisposition or intent to commit the offense before being approached by Mendoza. Mot. New Trl. at 3. Mr. Young contends the government has failed to meet this standard: Mr. Young argues that the government has failed to show Mendoza did not induce him into the deal and that Officer Rangel admitted that the substance at the scene of the crime could have been either legal hemp or illegal marijuana. Id. at 3–4. Thus, Mr. Young contends that the government failed to prove Mr. Young was not induced to commit the offense and that Mr. Young had a predisposition or intent to commit the offenses prior to being approached by Mendoza. Id.
Mr. Young reiterates his trial testimony that he had no intention of responding to Mendoza but gave in after Mendoza's constant calls. Id. at 1. As an initial matter, the Court recognizes the issue of Mendoza's credibility, but this testimony is not the only evidence to show a lack of inducement. In United States v. Alexander , the Fifth Circuit determined that even in the face of an untrustworthy witness testifying to counter an inducement claim, if there is sufficient additional evidence, the jury is entitled to conclude that the government's involvement did not rise the level of inducement. 681 F. App'x at 397 (2017). The government produced phone records—including transcripts, audio recordings, and text messages—showing a consistent correspondence between Mendoza and Mr. Young, including communications initiated by Mr. Young. Id. at 3. Indeed, Mr. Young responded quickly after Mendoza asked if he knew anyone who needed blow by asking Mendoza the price and how it was packaged. Def.’s Exs. 2, 3. In these communications, Mr. Young also demonstrated a knowledge of drug lingo and how to conduct the transactions. While Mr. Young testified that he would not have dealt with Mendoza without consistent pestering, ample credible evidence existed to counter Mr. Young's contention. Thus, even discounting Mendoza's as not credible, the Court finds that adequate evidence existed for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt Mendoza did not induce Mr. Young. See United States v. McLernon , 746 F.2d 1098, 1109 (6th Cir. 1984) ("Where a person is ready and willing to break the law, the mere fact that government agents provide what appears to be a favorable opportunity, or participate, themselves, in the offense itself, is not entrapment.").
Next, Mr. Young contends that the government has failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Young had a predisposition to commit the offense prior to being approached by the government's confidential source. Mot. New Trl. at 4. Mr. Young claims that (1) officer Mark Rangel's testimony regarding supposed marijuana found within Mr. Young's home does not meet the government's burden of proof, and (2) testimony from government witness Edward Lassiter was unreliable. Id. at 3–4. Despite the various assertions made by Mr. Young, the Court finds the evidence presented sufficient for the jury to find that that Mr. Young had a predisposition to commit the offense prior to being approached by a government agent. As mentioned above, the jury generally has discretion to believe or disbelieve testimony. Mora , 994 F.2d at 1137. In addition, Mr. Young has failed to address evidence provided by the government that demonstrated his knowledge of cocaine slang terminology and how cocaine transactions work. Rsp. New Trl. at 3–4. Indeed, the jury heard the recorded call between Mr. Young and Mr. Mendoza before the Sept. 17, 2020 transaction where Mr. Young repeatedly told Mr. Mendoza, "that's not how you do this." This abundance of evidence is more than sufficient for a jury to find that Mr. Young was not entrapped by Mr. Mendoza. See United States v. Pennell , 737 F.2d 521, 536 (6th Cir. 1984) (rejecting entrapment defense to cocaine conspiracy when defendant exhibited substantial knowledge of how cocaine transactions work and "defendant's statements made to the undercover agents during the negotiations for the two pounds of cocaine were highly probative on the predisposition issue").
b. The failure of some of Young's witnesses to testify was not a miscarriage of justice.
Mr. Young asserts two additional claims that he contends represent a "miscarriage of justice" that is required for the Court to grant a Motion for New Trial. Mot. New Trl. at 4.
Mr. Young argues that the Court's rejection of his motion to allow Jamison Sargent to testify remotely burdened his defense. Id. ; see also ECF No. 119. He argues the testimony was material to his defense as Sargent could clarify Mr. Young and Lassiter's relationship. Id. The Court disagrees. First , Sargent could have testified in person, and it was squarely within the Court's discretion to deny Mr. Young's perfunctory request for Sargent to testify remotely. Second , there is no evidence to suggest that Sargent's inability to testify represented a miscarriage of justice. As noted by Mr. Young, Sargent was meant to testify about the relationship between himself and Mr. Lassiter. Id. at 4. But Mr. Young presented various other witnesses—including himself and his wife—who testified in detail about his relationship with Lassiter. Mr. Young was not unfairly burdened, nor had his substantial rights violated, by Sargent's failure to testify. Wright , 534 F.3d at 775. Next, Mr. Young complains that Officers White and Smith, whom Mr. Young contends were properly subpoenaed to testify for the defense, did not appear in court. To begin, Mr. Young points to nothing in the record to show that both officers White and Smith were called to testify and failed to appear. Mr. Young also fails to demonstrate where in the record he sought to have the officers held in contempt of court for their failure to comply with a subpoena. Based on the Court's review, the only place in the record where the officers are mentioned were in a Motion for Leave to File. ECF No. 114 at 1. Even if the two officers were properly called to testify at trial, it is unlikely Mr. Young's substantive rights were harmed. United States v. Herman , 997 F.3d 251, 262 (5th Cir. 2021). It is a well-accepted principle that a defendant is entitled to a fair trial not a perfect one. Lutwak v. United States , 344 U.S. 604, 619, 73 S.Ct. 481, 97 L.Ed. 593 (1953). In United States v. Scroggins , the Fifth Circuit held that in a situation where two properly subpoenaed witnesses did not appear to testify at trial, a new trial should be granted only if the testimony of the two missing witnesses would have led the jury to probably (rather than might) acquit the defendant. 485 F.3d 824, 831 (5th Cir. 2007). Mr. Young, in his motion, provides no explanation as to why the testimony of the two officers would have led to an acquittal. Moreover, Mr. Young never sought to call or obtain a contempt order when these witnesses did not appear.
Therefore, Mr. Young's Motion for New Trial is hereby DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Young's Motions for New Trial and Acquittal are hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED on this 6th day of July, 2021.