Opinion
4:09-CR-32-CDL-MSH 4:97-CR-16-CDL-MSH
10-21-2021
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. ROBERT WOODS, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
STEPHEN HYLES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pending before the Court is Defendant's motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (ECF No. 129). For the following reasons, it is recommended that the motion be denied.
Defendant's motion for compassionate release has been docketed in both case number 4:97-CR-16 (“Woods I”) and case number 4:09-CR-32 (“Woods II”). Although this Recommendation applies to both cases, the Court's citations to the record-unless otherwise indicated-are to documents filed in Woods II.
BACKGROUND
On July 27, 2010, Defendant pleaded guilty in Woods II to a single count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. Change of Plea, ECF No. 42; Indictment 3, ECF No. 1. Prior to sentencing, the United States Probation Office (“USPO”) prepared a pre-sentence report (“PSR”) using the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”) (ECF No. 116). The USPO calculated a Guidelines sentencing range of 262-327 months for his conviction in Woods II and 37-46 months for any revocation of his supervised release in Woods I. PSR ¶¶ 78, 86 ECF No. 116. On February 10, 2011, the Court revoked Defendant's supervised release in Woods I. Minute Sheet, ECF No. 58. The Court, however concluded that the advisory Guidelines sentencing range on the revocation to be inadequate, and so, it sentenced Defendant to 60 months' imprisonment. Id. The Court then sentenced Defendant to 262 months' imprisonment in Woods II to be served consecutively to his sentence in Woods I for a total term of imprisonment of 322 months. Id. The Court also sentenced Defendant to five years of supervised release following his prison term. Id. Defendant moved to vacate his sentence on June 22, 2017, but the Court denied the motion on April 17, 2018 (ECF Nos. 113, 118).
In Woods I, Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and sentenced on February 2, 1998, to 135 months' imprisonment followed by 5 years of supervised release. PSR ¶ 49.
The Court received Defendant's motion for compassionate release on May 3, 2021, (ECF No. 129). Defendant seeks compassionate release based “his age (48), his disproportionately long sentence, and family circumstances.” Mot. for Compassionate Release 4, ECF No. 129. The Government responded to Defendant's motion on September 9, 2021 (ECF No. 136). Defendant's motion for compassionate release is ripe for review.
DISCUSSION
A district court “‘may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except' under certain circumstances.” United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 909 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)). One circumstance is the compassionate release exception provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Id. at 909-10. Under that section, a prisoner may obtain compassionate release if, “after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)], ” the district court finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such reduction . . . and that such reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The Sentencing Commission's policy statement for compassionate release is found at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Under the policy statement, a defendant must show that he “is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2). Further, a defendant must show that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(1)(A). A defendant bears the burden of proving entitlement to compassionate release. See United States v. Mantack, 833 Fed.Appx. 819, 819-20 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Green, 764 F.3d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 2014)).
In addition to extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a reduction, compassionate release may also be granted to a defendant who is over 70 years old and has served at least 30 years in prison pursuant to a sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). This provision is inapplicable to Defendant.
Defendant fails to show extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting compassionate release. The Sentencing Commission policy statement provides four circumstances that constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1. The first is a qualifying medical condition. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A). Defendant, however, does not rely on a medical condition, so this circumstance is inapplicable to him.
The Government construes Defendant's motion as one based-at least in part-on risks posed to his health by the Covid-19 pandemic. Gov't Resp. to Mot. for Compassionate Release 1, ECF No. 136. Defendant, however, never mentions the Covid-19 pandemic in his motion or argues that he has a particular medical condition that constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction.
The second circumstance is the defendant's age. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(B). Defendant argues that he is “now 48 years old, aged out of further crime.” Mot. for Compassionate Release 6. In order for this circumstance to apply, however, a defendant must be “at least 65 years old.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(B)(i). Defendant, therefore, does not qualify.
The third circumstance is family circumstances. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(C). The only specific family circumstance cited by Defendant, however, is his desire to lead a “life where his legacy for his children will not be one of prison visits and fifteen-minute phone calls.” Mot. for Compassionate Release 6. In order for family circumstances to constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release, though, a defendant must show the “death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant's minor child or minor children” or the “incapacitation of the defendant's spouse or registered partner when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered partner.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(C). Defendant does not show either of these circumstances to be present, and so, he does not qualify under this provision.
The fourth circumstance is “other reasons, ” which is where “[a]s determined by the Director of the [BOP], there exists in the defendant's case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(D). “‘[O]ther reasons' are limited to those determined by the [BOP], not by courts.” United States v. Lee, 857 Fed.Appx. 556, 558 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1246-49 (11th Cir. 2021)). Therefore, a district court lacks the authority to determine if a defendant's circumstances qualify as an “other reason” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(D). Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1247-48, 1263. There is no evidence that the BOP has determined that
Defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release.
Thus, the fourth circumstance does not apply to Defendant either.
Moreover, compassionate release is inappropriate after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). These factors include:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims.United States v. Macli, 842 Fed.Appx. 549, 552 n.1 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
The first three factors listed above-which are codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A), and (2)(B)-weigh decidedly against Defendant. Defendant was sentenced as a career offender. PSR ¶¶ 28-29, 56. Defendant's conduct in this case involved possession of approximately 285 grams of cocaine base and $81,000 in United States currency, which he admitted was proceeds from drug sales. Plea Agreement ¶ 7, ECF No. 43. At the time he committed the offense, he was on supervised release for his prior drug conviction in Woods I involving approximately 160.7 grams of cocaine base. PSR ¶¶ 50-51. Compassionate release or a sentence reduction would not reflect the seriousness of the crime or Defendant's criminal history, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, or deter future criminal conduct.
Defendant refers to his “disproportionately long sentence, ” presumably invoking the need to “avoid unwarranted sentence disparities.” Mot. for Compassionate Release 4; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). He cites the disparity in sentencing between convictions involving cocaine base versus powder cocaine. Mot. for Compassionate Release 5. He does not, however, cite any disparities with other defendants convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, and his argument regarding the difference between treatment of cocaine base and powder cocaine is best addressed in his pending motion to reduce sentence under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018), and U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) (ECF No. 132).
The Court has considered the remaining factors in § 3553(a) and, to the extent they are applicable, finds that none of them provide sufficient weight to justify Defendant's release. Thus, as an additional and alternative ground for denial of Defendant's motion for compassionate release, the Court finds that even if Defendant established extraordinary and compelling reasons, release is not warranted after consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Defendant's motion for compassionate release (ECF No. 129) be DENIED. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy hereof. The district judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The Court's recommendation also applies to Defendant's motion for compassionate release as docketed in Woods I (ECF No. 289).
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED.