Opinion
16-7757
07-15-2021
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JERRELL IVEY WOODLEY, a/k/a Rell, Defendant-Appellant.
Frances H. Pratt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Daniel Taylor Young, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED
Submitted: June 30, 2021
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge. (2:11-cr-00058-RAJ-FBS-2; 2:16-cv-00333-RAJ)
Frances H. Pratt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.
Daniel Taylor Young, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WYNN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM
Jerrell Ivey Woodley appeals the district court's order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. Woodley pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The predicate for the § 924(c) offense was assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering activity, which, in turn, was predicated on two Virginia state offenses. The district court sentenced Woodley to 120 months' imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The district court denied Woodley's § 2255 motion as untimely.
On appeal, we granted a certificate of appealability on the following issue: whether, in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019), and In re Thomas, 988 F.3d 783 (4th Cir. 2021), the district court erred in dismissing Woodley's § 2255 motion as untimely. The Government has withdrawn its timeliness defense to Woodley's § 2255 motion but nevertheless suggests that we may affirm Woodley's § 924(c) conviction because it remains lawful after Davis. Woodley moves to remand this case so the district court may consider the merits of his claim in the first instance.
When the district court previously considered Woodley's § 2255 motion, it did not have the benefit of our recent holding in Thomas that "Davis applies retroactively to cases on collateral review." 988 F.3d at 786. We concluded that the Davis rule is substantive because it placed individuals "who had committed a crime . . . that satisfied the [crime of violence] definition in . . . [§ 924(c)'s] residual clause . . . beyond the government's power to prosecute," id. at 789, and noted that the Supreme Court made Davis retroactive because the Court "has held that new substantive rules of constitutional law generally apply 2 retroactively to cases on collateral review." Id. at 790 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court determined that the § 2255 motion was untimely; therefore, it did not reach the merits of Woodley's § 2255 motion in the first instance. Because "we are a court of review, not of first view," Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 203 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), we vacate the district court's order and grant Woodley's motion to remand to the district court for consideration of the § 2255 motion in light of Thomas. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED