Opinion
4:11-cr-00003
2021-11-01
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. James Leonard WOOD, Defendant.
Jason T. Griess, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, DES MOINES, IA, for Plaintiff.
Jason T. Griess, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, DES MOINES, IA, for Plaintiff.
ORDER
ROBERT W. PRATT, Judge
Before the Court is Defendant James Leonard Wood's third pro se motion seeking to modify the conditions of his supervised release. ECF No. 78. Defendant pleaded guilty to Attempted Enticement of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). See ECF Nos. 41, 56. On September 16, 2011, the Court sentenced Defendant to 120 months of incarceration followed by ten years of supervised release. ECF No. 56. The Court ordered Defendant be subject to mandatory and special conditions of supervision. Id.
Defendant asks the Court to modify the special conditions of his supervision to suspend the polygraph requirement, to allow him to use a computer with internet unsupervised, and to permit him to drink alcohol. ECF No. 78. In Defendant's first motion, he asked the Court to modify the conditions of his supervision to allow him to use a computer unsupervised and to drink alcohol. ECF No. 64. The Court denied the motion, concluding neither modification was appropriate. ECF No. 73. As to the computer condition, the Court noted "[t]he facts underlying Defendant's conviction involve Defendant using a computer to contact a purported minor for participation in sexual acts." Id. (citing ECF No. 52 ¶ 5). Thus, the Court held, "given the nature and circumstances of the offense, this special condition is especially important and serves the particular purpose of protecting the public." Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1) ; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(C) ). With respect to the alcohol condition, the Court noted "Defendant has a history of abusing drugs and alcohol and has a prior conviction for Operating While Intoxicated." Id. (citing ECF No. 52 ¶¶ 22, 35–38). Thus, the Court held, "this special condition reasonably relates to Defendant's history and characteristics and furthers the purposes of deterrence and protection of the public." Id. (citing § 3583(d)(1) ; § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (C) ).
In his second motion, Defendant asked the Court to modify the conditions of his supervised release to permit him to (1) use a computer with internet, (2) use a smart phone with internet, (3) use a bow with trigger release for hunting, (4) consume alcohol, (5) travel to the Northern District of Iowa for fishing and hunting, and (6) camp at primitive campgrounds. ECF No. 74. Defendant further asked the Court to change his status on the Iowa Sex Offender Registry from Tier 2 to Tier 1. Id. The Court denied Defendant's requests for modification of the conditions of his supervised release after concluding Defendant's conditions are "reasonably related to the factors set forth in [§] 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D)" and do not involve a "greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary." ECF No. 75 (citing § 3583(d)(1), (2) ). The Court also noted that in order for Defendant to change his tier level on the Iowa Sex Offender Registry, Defendant needed to file a formal request with the Iowa Department of Public Safety, which will review his registration requirements. Id.
It is clear from Defendant's most recent Motion that he has no remorse for the crime he committed. He refers to himself as "innocent" and suggests he was entrapped by federal law enforcement officers. A defendant's "lack of remorse is an aggravating factor which outweighs his prior lack of a significant criminal history." United States v. Starr , 459 F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1183 (S.D. Iowa 2020) (citation omitted). Defendant's lack of remorse raises doubts about whether he "respect[s] the law," § 3553(a)(2)(A), and has received sufficient "deterrence," § 3553(a)(2)(B). The Court recognizes Defendant has satisfactorily completed the requirements for individual and group sex-offense specific treatment. However, the Court agrees with the U.S. Probation Office's position that on-going polygraph examinations are a critical component of Defendant's supervision and long-term treatment plan. See ECF No. 79. Defendant's lack of remorse demonstrates he continues to be a danger to the community. Also of serious concern to the Court is Defendant's statement that at the time of his arrest he "didn't have a moment of weakness," he was instead "venting out [his] frustration at women over social site Craigs List." ECF No. 78 at 5. For these reasons, the Court denies Defendant's request to suspend his polygraph examinations. And for the reasons stated in this Court's Order denying Defendant's first motion to modify his conditions relating to alcohol and computer use, the Court denies these requests as well. See ECF No. 73.
Defendant also complains that his U.S. Probation Officer prevented him from using the internet to contact an attorney relating to civil lawsuits he wanted to file against federal law enforcement officers and the government. ECF No. 78. The U.S. Probation Office responds that it assisted Defendant in identifying resources to allow him supervised internet access to obtain legal information and also provided Defendant with contact information for legal counsel when it was requested. ECF No. 79. Defendant's claim is without merit because there is no constitutional right to counsel in civil cases. Patterson v. Kelley , 902 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2018).
Defendant is serving a ten-year term of supervised release. ECF No. 56. The Court again reminds Defendant that a term of supervised release is an important part of his sentence, as are the mandatory and special conditions imposed. "Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in their transition to community life." United States v. Johnson , 529 U.S. 53, 59, 120 S.Ct. 1114, 146 L.Ed.2d 39 (2000). "Supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration." Id. It also serves the purpose of protecting the community.
Defendant's pro se motion to modify the conditions of his supervision (ECF No. 78) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.