Opinion
20-50328
09-27-2022
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted June 16, 2022 Pasadena, California
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Nos. 2:00-cr-01025-JFW-1, 2:00-cr-01025-JFW John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Before: RAWLINSON and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and NAVARRO, District Judge.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
MEMORANDUM
Cornell Eugene Wilson, Jr. appeals from the district court's denial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Wilson Jr. contends that the district court erred by treating U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 as binding when determining whether extraordinary and compelling reasons existed for a sentence reduction in his case. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate and remand.
We review decisions under § 3582(c)(1) for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021). A district court abuses its discretion "if it does not apply the correct law or if it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of material fact." Id. (citation omitted).
In Aruda, we determined that "the current version of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is not an 'applicable policy statement[]' for 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed by a defendant," and thus, it should not be treated by district courts as binding. 993 F.3d at 802 (quoting § 3582(c)(1)(A)) (alteration in original). In the order denying Wilson, Jr.'s motion, the district court identified U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 as the "applicable policy statement," indicating that it impermissibly treated U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 as binding. While the district court also included a footnote observing that the U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 factors may be outdated, that footnote alone does not confirm that the district court declined to treat U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 as binding.
The Government argues that we should still affirm the district court's order based on our precedent in United States v. Keller, which allows district courts to deny motions for compassionate release solely based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. 2 F.4th 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 2021). However, in the present case, the district court merely denied Wilson Jr.'s motion "for the reasons stated in the Government's Opposition." While the Government discussed the § 3553(a) factors in its opposition, the district court did not address the § 3553(a) factors at all in denying Wilson Jr.'s motion.
A district court sufficiently considers the § 3553(a) factors for purposes of sentence reduction by "making clear that he or she has . . . taken account of the § 3553(a) factors," such as by explicitly stating that it considered § 3553(a) or by referencing facts and circumstances of the case that would normally factor into the § 3553(a) analysis. See Chavez-Mesa v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1959, 1965 (2018); see also United States v. Trujillo, 713 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2013) ("[E]ven where a judge never mentions '§ 3553(a),' it may be clear from the court's experience and consideration of the record that the factors were properly taken into account."). Here, the district court neither explicitly stated that it considered the § 3553(a) factors, nor engaged with any facts specific to Wilson Jr. that demonstrated consideration of the factors.
Because it is unclear whether the district court treated the U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 as binding, and because the district court failed to sufficiently consider the § 3553(a) factors as an independent reason for dismissal, we vacate and remand so that the district court can reassess Wilson Jr.'s motion for compassionate release in light of Aruda, as well as United States v. Chen, ___ F.4th ___ (9th Cir. 2022).
VACATED AND REMANDED.
The Honorable Gloria M. Navarro, United States District Judge for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.