Opinion
1:18-CR-00123 EAW
2020-06-16
UNITED STATES of America, v. Robert L. WILLIAMS, Jr., Defendant.
Emmanuel O. Ulubiyo, U.S. Attorney's Office, Buffalo, NY, for United States of America. MaryBeth Covert, Federal Public Defender Office, Buffalo, NY, for Defendant.
Emmanuel O. Ulubiyo, U.S. Attorney's Office, Buffalo, NY, for United States of America.
MaryBeth Covert, Federal Public Defender Office, Buffalo, NY, for Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is a motion filed by defendant Robert L. Williams, Jr. (hereinafter "Defendant") for release from custody pending his sentencing in this matter due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (Dkt. 56). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is denied.
On March 13, 2020, the President declared a National Emergency concerning COVID-19. Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15337 (Mar. 13, 2020). According to the World Health Organization's website, as of June 15, 2020, there were 7,805,148 confirmed cases of COVID-19 worldwide, with 431,192 confirmed deaths. See WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard , World Health Org., https://covid19.who.int/ (last visited June 15, 2020).
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 18, 2018, Defendant was charged by criminal complaint with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession of firearm) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(3) and 924(a)(1)(D) (unlawfully transporting firearms from outside the state). (Dkt. 1). Defendant was arrested on that same date (see May 18, 2018 Minute Entry), but because a state parole detainer was lodged against Defendant, no detention hearing was held (May 23, 2018 Minute Entry). Instead, Defendant reserved his right to move for bail if that detainer was lifted. ( Id. ). Defendant was originally indicted on June 14, 2018 (Dkt. 4), and a Superseding Indictment was returned on February 4, 2020, charging Defendant as follows:
(1) conspiracy to commit firearm offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 1);
(2) unlawfully dealing in firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A), 923(a), and 924(a)(1)(D) (Count 2);
(3) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 3);
(4) possession of firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (Counts 4 and 6);
(5) possession with intent to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (Count 5); and
(6) felon in possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (Counts 7 and 8).
(Dkt. 43).
On February 21, 2020, Defendant appeared before the undersigned and pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 of the Superseding Indictment. (Dkt. 50; Dkt. 51). The plea agreement contemplates an aggregate recommended prison sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines of 295 to 353 months. (Dkt. 50 at ¶ 15). Defendant was called as a witness by the Government at a trial of two alleged co-conspirators that took place earlier this year, see Minute Entry, United States v. Thompson , No. 1:18-cr-00126-EAW-HKS, Dkt. 305 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2020), and testified that he travelled to Ohio to procure firearms with the use of straw purchasers, and then transported those firearms to Buffalo, New York, where they were sold. The evidence at trial established that some of the firearms were recovered at various crime scenes in Buffalo. Defendant is held in the custody of the United States Marshals Service ("USMS") at the Niagara County Jail (Dkt. 56 at ¶ 15), and by consent of both parties, no sentencing date has been scheduled.
Defendant now brings a motion to be released on conditions pending sentencing. (Dkt. 56). Defendant contends that his request for release is justified by the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant cites to the alleged diagnosis of seven guards at the Niagara County Jail with COVID-19 since April 20, 2020, and the lack of any testing of inmates. (Id. at ¶ 15) Defendant contends that he suffers from high blood pressure, high cholesterol, ulcers and other stomach issues, asthma, and allergies, and that he is not receiving the necessary medication in the Niagara County Jail for these ailments. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-22). Defendant contends that the state parole detainer that initially caused him to waive his right to a detention hearing, is set to be released (id. at ¶¶ 5, 31), and he seeks release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(g), 3142(i) and/or 3143 (id. at ¶ 32).
The Government filed a response in opposition on June 3, 2020. (Dkt. 60). The Government contends that Defendant's offenses of conviction mandate detention pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2), that Defendant has failed to meet his burden for release pending sentencing, and that the Niagara County Jail has implemented precautionary measures sufficient to protect against the spread of COVID-19. (Dkt. 60 at 2-3).
In addition, the United States Probation Office ("USPO") submitted a memorandum in opposition to Defendant's motion, noting Defendant's criminal history spans a 25-year period, he has accumulated six prior bench warrants and has arrests for false personation, he has at least five prior felony convictions, he has prior arrests for narcotics, firearms, robbery, and other violent offenses, he has at least ten arrests while on bail or subject to some form of supervision and multiple revocations of supervision, and his prior federal case occurred while he was under state parole. (Dkt. 58). Indeed, the parties have calculated Defendant's criminal history as a category IV in the plea agreement. (Dkt. 50 at ¶ 12).
According to the USPO, Defendant is subject to parole supervision until August 14, 2022. (Dkt. 58 at 1). Defendant disputes this contention, instead claiming that Defendant was released from parole as of May 21, 2020. (Dkt. 59). The issue is not dispositive to the pending motion, and is relevant only to the extent that Defendant claims he is now entitled to a detention hearing because of the release of the parole detainer.
III. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, the Court rejects Defendant's reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 3142 as a basis for his claim that he is somehow now entitled to a detention hearing. By its express terms, § 3142 applies to the release or detention of a defendant pending trial, whereas § 3143 applies pending sentence. Accordingly, Defendant cannot rely on the provisions of § 3142 in support of his claim that he is entitled to a detention hearing now that the parole detainer has allegedly been lifted. See United States v. Jones , No. CR RDB-18-0339, 2020 WL 1904730, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 17, 2020) ("While Defendant asserts 18 U.S.C. § 3142 as the basis for his Motion, Section 3142 specifically applies in cases where a defendant is seeking release pending trial.... The proper standard to evaluate Defendant's request is 18 U.S.C. § 3143, which applies in cases where a defendant is seeking release pending sentencing, as is the case here."); United States v. Jones , 452 F. Supp. 3d 258, 260–61, No. CR 18-100 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2020) (finding § 3142 inapplicable and § 3143 controlling where "Defendant waived his right to a detention hearing, pled guilty to all charges in the Superseding Indictment, and did not contest the Court's order that he remain detained pending sentencing or seek release on bond at the conclusion of his change of plea hearing"); see also United States v. Scali , No. 7:16-CR-466-(NSR), 2018 WL 3410015, at *2 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2018) (discussing that the government "mistakenly applie[d] the part of the statute controlling detention pre-trial ( 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) ) to the present pre-sentencing context" and that § 3143 "governs release prior to sentencing"), aff'd , 738 F. App'x 32 (2d Cir. 2018). Certainly, if Defendant was still presumed innocent and being held in custody pretrial, he would be entitled to a detention hearing in accordance with the procedures outlined in § 3142, but now that he has admitted his guilt and is being held pending sentencing, the provisions of § 3143 apply.
Similarly, the Court rejects Defendant's reliance on § 3142(i) in support of his request for release. Again, this provision falls within the section of the Bail Reform Act dealing with detention prior to trial, not after conviction and prior to sentencing. The Court acknowledges that courts appear divided on the applicability of § 3142(i) in the post-conviction context. Compare United States v. Morris , 452 F. Supp. 3d 484, 485–88 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2020) (discussing split among courts as to whether 3142(i) applies post-plea, and concluding that it does not), and United States v. Hartsell , 448 F. Supp. 3d 975, 977 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 25, 2020) ("3142(i) applies to pretrial detainees, but not those who have pleaded guilty and merely await sentencing."), with United States v. Kennedy , 449 F. Supp. 3d 713, 716–18 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2020) (concluding that 3142(i) applies to the defendant who had pled guilty and was awaiting sentencing rather than trial), reconsideration denied , 2020 WL 1547878 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 1, 2020). However, the Court finds more persuasive the reasoning of those courts that have found § 3142(i) is not applicable post-plea. See United States v. Greene , 453 F. Supp. 3d 608, 610, No. 6:19-CR-06147 EAW (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2020) (" Section 3142(i) applies to detention and release pre-conviction, not post-plea as in Defendant's case."); see also United States v. Paulino , 19 Cr. 54 (PGG), 2020 WL 1847914, at *5 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2020) ("Because Paulino has pled guilty, his reliance on Section 3142(i) is misplaced." (citations omitted)); United States v. McDuffie , 451 F. Supp. 3d 281, 283 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2020) ("Although defense counsel brings this motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i), which allows for temporary pre-trial release for a ‘compelling reason,’ the motion is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c), which applies when a defendant is awaiting sentencing.").
Accordingly, because of the nature of Defendant's convictions, he must establish the following in order to justify his release pending sentencing: "(1) by clear and convincing evidence that he is not likely to flee; (2) by clear and convincing evidence that he does not pose a danger to any other person or the community; and (3) that exceptional reasons are clearly shown warranting his release." United States v. Harris , 192 F. Supp. 3d 337, 347 (W.D.N.Y. 2016).
Alternatively, a defendant convicted of the crimes that Defendant pleaded guilty to may meet his burden to be released after conviction if in addition to establishing that he is not a flight risk or danger, he establishes that "there is a substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted," 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2)(A)(i), or "an attorney for the Government has recommended that no sentence of imprisonment be imposed on the person," id. § 3143(a)(2)(A)(ii). Defendant does not argue that either of these alternative bases for release are applicable.
The exceptional circumstances relied upon by Defendant are the COVID-19 pandemic, his current medical condition, and the conditions at the Niagara County Jail. The Court is cognizant of Defendant's medical concerns in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, at least one of his medical conditions appears to place him at higher risk of becoming seriously ill if he contracts COVID-19. See Frequently Asked Questions: Higher Risk , Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention (June 2, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/faq.html#Higher-Risk. Moreover, while the Government cites to various preventative measures undertaken by the Niagara County Jail and its apparent success in that there have been no confirmed cases of COVID-19 at the jail as of June 1, 2020 (Dkt. 60 at 11, 14-15), the reality is that prison settings present unique challenges in preventing the spread of disease, see generally Brown v. Plata , 563 U.S. 493, 519-20, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011) (describing overcrowded California prison system as "breeding grounds for disease"). Those challenges have proven to be particularly acute when dealing with COVID-19. See, e.g. , Martinez-Brooks v. Easter , 459 F. Supp. 3d 411, 438–42, No. 3:20-cv-00569 (MPS) (D. Conn. May 12, 2020) (finding likelihood of success on Eighth Amendment claims based on conditions at FCI Danbury, where there was an active and serious outbreak of COVID-19, social distancing was not practical, and warden failed to consider transfers of medically vulnerable inmates in any meaningful way). Certainly, there are gaps in Defendant's proof with respect to both his medical conditions and the conditions at the jail, and the Court would need to either require supplemental submissions or conduct a hearing in order to resolve those issues. Nonetheless, for purposes of this motion, the Court will assume (without deciding) that the COVID-19 pandemic, Defendant's medical conditions, and the conditions at the Niagara County Jail, establish exceptional circumstances.
The Court agrees with the Government that Defendant has failed to support his existing medical conditions with medical records (Dkt. 60 at 11), but for purposes of this motion assumes that Defendant's claimed preexisting medical conditions are accurately stated in the motion.
However, the risks of flight and danger are fatal to Defendant's motion. Based on both his offense conduct and his criminal record, which as noted in the USPO memorandum includes repeated felony convictions, bench warrants, and criminal conduct while under supervision (Dkt. 58), Defendant presents a significant flight risk and risk of danger, and no condition or combination of conditions could protect against those risks. See United States v. Steward , No. S1:20CR0052 (DLC), 2020 WL 1468005, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2020) (citing the defendant's "lengthy criminal record, including for violation of conditions of release and supervision on release" as a factor favoring detention). Defendant's offense conduct, to which he has admitted guilt, represents highly dangerous activity, and Defendant faces a significant prison sentence in this case, which only increases the risks of him failing to surrender for any sentence. Scali , 2018 WL 3410015, at *2. It is Defendant's burden to establish that the risks of flight or danger do not prevent his release, and he has failed to meet that burden with respect to either risk. Accordingly, his motion for release must be denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for release is denied. (Dkt. 56). The Court notes that in the event that Defendant desires to proceed to sentencing, his counsel should contact the Court for purposes of arranging a sentencing date. Likewise, Defendant makes some conclusory claims in his motion that he is not receiving appropriate medical care at the Niagara County Jail. His counsel should pursue those issues with the USMS, but in the event he is unsatisfied with the result, he may request an appearance before the undersigned for purposes of addressing the same.
SO ORDERED.