” United States v. Westine, No. CRIM. 14-10-GFVT, 2015 WL 45515, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 2, 2015), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Ramer, 883 F.3d 659 (6th Cir. 2018); see also Bell, 516 F.3d at 443 (counting cases) (noting prior bad act evidence may only be probative when the prior acts “were part of the same scheme or involved a similar modus operandi as the present offense”).
Moreover, Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) outlines a nonexhaustive list of other permissible uses of other bad acts evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2); United States v. Westine, No. 14-CV-10-GFVT, 2015 WL 45515, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 2, 2015) (Rule 404(b)(2) "list is not exhaustive"). Defendant is not using Phoenix's acts of domestic violence to show that she has a tendency to commit domestic violence, but rather to shed light on Phoenix's marital issues, which, as discussed as it pertains to Requests 5 and 6, is relevant in determining how much of Phoenix's claimed emotional distress is attributable to Defendant's actions versus Phoenix's other problems.
[R. 274-2.] Unlike his co-defendant, John Westine, Ramer did not spend the years between his prior bad acts and the present moment in prison. See United States v. Westine, No. CRIM. 14-10-GFVT, 2015 WL 45515, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 2, 2015) ("While many years have passed since Westine's last conviction, the Court notes that Westine was incarcerated for nearly the entire period between his past conviction and committing his most recent fraud.") While there is "no absolute maximum number of years that may separate a prior act and the offense charged," a survey of the case law puts the question into better perspective. Id. (quoting United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253, 1260 (6th Cir. 1985)).