It is, by no means, "so general" that it fails to "advise the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused." United States v. Wedd, No. 15-CR-616, 2016 WL 1055737, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2016) (quoting United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1997)).
The Court therefore declines to require disclosure of all surveillance techniques used against Hossain in this case on Brady grounds. See United States v. Wedd, No. 15-CR-616, 2016 WL 1055737, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2016) (denying defendant's request for disclosure of Brady materials where the court found "no basis to believe that the Government has failed to meet its Brady obligations or will not continue to meet them"). The Court also disagrees with Hossain's one-sentence contention that "Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(C), 16(a)(1)(B)(i), and 16(a)(1)(E)(i) also support [his] request for notice and discovery."
For example, the superseding indictment broadly identifies the timeframe of the crimes, alleging that the conspiracy lasted from "November 2013 through in or about February 2016." Dkt No. 70; cf. United States v. Wedd, 15-cr-616 (KBF), 2016 WL 1055737, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2016) (denying bill of particulars request when the indictment "include[d] a chronology of the formation of the scheme" and "identifie[d] the approximate dates of key events that were part of the scheme"). Additionally, the superseding indictment provides limited location information, stating that the defendants committed their crimes "in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere."