Opinion
CR-22-08029-001-PCT-SPL
02-22-2023
United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Damian Andrew Wathogoma, Defendant.
(FILED UNDER SEAL)
ORDER
Honorable Steven P. Logan United States District Judge.
Before the Court is Defendant Damian Andrew Wathogoma's (“Defendant”) Motion for Voluntariness Determination (Doc. 56) in which Defendant requests a finding by this Court that certain inculpatory statements made by Defendant on January 24, 2022 were involuntary and therefore inadmissible at trial. The Government filed a Response brief opposing Defendant's Motion. (Doc. 61). Defendant did not file a Reply brief. The Motion is therefore fully briefed and ready for review.
Defendant requested an Evidentiary Hearing on the voluntariness issue. (Doc. 56 at 1). The Court granted Defendant's request and provided the parties with the opportunity to argue and present evidence with respect to the voluntariness issue during the Final Pretrial Conference. (Doc. 68). At the Hearing, however, both parties declined to make any argument or to present any evidence and instead stated their mutual intention to rely on their briefing alone.
“Under Miranda, custodial interrogation of a defendant must be preceded by the advice that he has the rights, among others, to remain silent and to have an attorney present.” Bradford v. Davis, 923 F.3d 599, 615 (9th Cir. 2019). “[Statements that are the product of interrogation not preceded by appropriate warnings are inadmissible, where the accused was questioned while ‘in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way.'” United States v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1987)). An interrogation is “custodial” where, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person “would have felt deprived of [his] freedom of action in any significant way, such that he would not have felt free to terminate the interrogation.” United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 2008). In the Ninth Circuit, five factors are relevant to determine whether an accused is in custody. See Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d at 580 (listing five factors).
Here, the statements at issue were made by Defendant on January 24, 2022. (Doc. 56 at 1). That day, Yavapai-Apache Police Department Detective Steven Ganis (“Detective Ganis”) and FBI Special Agent Brian McGrew (“Agent McGrew”) met with Defendant for approximately fifty minutes in a breakroom at Beaver Creek Elementary School, where Defendant worked as a janitor. (Id. at 1-2). It is undisputed that Defendant was not advised of his right to counsel nor his right to remain silent. (Id. at 2). During the interaction, Defendant alleges that he denied any wrongdoing but eventually made inculpatory statements. (Id.). Defendant does not argue that he was in custody but nonetheless contends that his statements were involuntary based on the totality of the circumstances. (Id. at 3).
Defendant is correct that even noncustodial interrogations may, in certain circumstances, produce involuntary confessions. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1976) (quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961)) (“We recognize, of course, that noncustodial interrogation might possibly in some situations, by virtue of some special circumstances, be characterized as one where ‘the behavior of . . . law enforcement officials was such as to overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring about confessions not feely self-determined.'”). Therefore, the Court has a duty “to examine the entire record and make an independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness.” Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741-42 (1966); see also Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972) (“[W]hen a confession challenged as involuntary is sought to be used against a criminal defendant at his trial, he is entitled to a reliable and clear-cut determination that the confession was in fact voluntarily rendered.”). The Government has the burden of proving “at least by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary.” Lego, 404 U.S. at 489.
To determine voluntariness, the question is “whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the government obtained the statement by physical or psychological coercion or by improper inducement so that the suspect's will was overborne.” United States v. Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1988). The Court must inquire into “both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). Factors that the Court may consider include the defendant's age, maturity, education, physical condition, mental health, and overall intelligence. See id. The Court may also consider whether the defendant was advised of his right to remain silent or of his right to counsel, the location and length of the interrogation, the nature and circumstances of the questioning, the presence of any police coercion, and the use of any physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep. See id.
Here, Defendant is correct that some factors weigh in favor of an involuntariness finding. Defendant is just twenty years old, has only a high school education, and does not have a criminal record. He was not advised of his constitutional rights, did not have an attorney present, and was not offered an opportunity to confer with counsel. He was approached by Detective Ganis and Agent McGrew somewhat unexpectedly and at his place of employment. The officers' questions were persistent, lasting approximately fifty minutes. That said, these facts alone are insufficient for the Court to find that Defendant's will was overborne. When the other factual circumstances are considered, the balance of the factors weighs heavily in favor of a finding that Defendant's statements were voluntary. There is no evidence that Defendant's maturity, physical condition, mental health, or overall intelligence played a significant factor in Defendant's response to questioning. The interrogation was not unusually prolonged or lengthy and took place at his place of employment rather than at a police station. It did not involve any threats or coercive tactics and the officers did not engage in any deceit, trickery, or misrepresentations. There is no evidence of any physical punishment and Defendant was not physically restrained. This Court's review of the interrogation's transcript reveals that Defendant was told at least four times that he was not under arrest and that he would not be arrested that day. (Doc. 61-1 at 4, 26, 45, 53). Furthermore, Defendant acknowledged that he knew what the officers were there to talk to him about and he began explaining the circumstances of the alleged incident almost immediately upon being asked about it, with very little prompting from the officers. (Id. at 4-6, 14-16). Thus, the transcript undermines Defendant's assertion that the interaction was unexpected or that he made the statements involuntarily. See United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding statements voluntary despite interrogation taking place in FBI office and despite officers' use of deceptive tactics because interrogation lasted only one hour, officers' deceptions did not misrepresent strength of their case, officers did not engage in coercive conduct, suspect was not in custody, and suspect repeatedly told not under arrest).
Having considered the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that Defendant's statements were voluntary and that they were not obtained in violation of Defendant's constitutional rights. The statements are admissible.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Voluntariness Determination (Doc. 56) is denied.