Opinion
Case No.: 1:12-CR-00284-AWI
02-20-2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. APOLINAR VERDUZCO-MEDINA, Defendant.
Elana S. Landau Assistant United States Attorney Anthony P. Capozzi Attorney for APOLINAR VERDUZCO-MEDINA
ANTHONY P. CAPOZZI, CSBN: 068525
NICHOLAS A. CAPOZZI, CSBN: 275568
LAW OFFICES OF ANTHONY P. CAPOZZI
1233 W. Shaw Avenue, Suite 102
Fresno, California 93711
Telephone: (559) 221-0200
Facsimile: (559) 221-7997
E-mail: capozzilaw@aol.com
Attorney for Defendant,
APOLINAR VERDUZCO-MEDINA
STIPULATION AND ORDER TO
CONTINUE SENTENCING
Date: March 4, 2013
Hon. Anthony W. Ishii
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for sentencing on March 4, 2013, at 10:00 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the sentencing until April 8, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. and to exclude time between March 4, 2013, and April 8, 2013, under 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv). Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Due to the unavailability of counsel and the defendant has not been interviewed to determine if the safety valve provision of U.S.C. § 5(C)(1)(2) applies. The defendant is scheduled for this interview on February 20, 2013.
b. This continuance is needed in order to allow the defendant and the Probation Office to complete the Presentence Report based upon this interview.
c. The government does not object to the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 4, 2013, to April 8, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence. IT IS SO STIPULATED.
Elana S. Landau
Assistant United States
Attorney
_______________
Anthony P. Capozzi
Attorney for
APOLINAR VERDUZCO-MEDINA
ORDER
For reasons set forth above, the continuance requested by the parties is granted for good cause and time is excluded under the Speedy Trial Act from March 4, 2013, to, and including, April 8, 2013, based upon the Court's finding that the ends of justice outweigh the public's and defendant's interest in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7)(A).
IT IS ORDERED that the Sentencing currently scheduled on March 4, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. is continued to April 8, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. IT IS SO ORDERED.
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SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE