Opinion
CASE NO. 2:11-cr-00393 LKK
03-18-2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ARMANDO VASQUEZ-BARRAGAN, a.k.a. Armando Arula Vasquez, Defendant.
DANNY D. BRACE Counsel for Defendant NIRAV K. DESAI Assistant U.S. Attorney
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER
United States Attorney
NIRAV K. DESAI
Assistant U.S. Attorney
501 I Street, Suite 10-100
Sacramento, California 95814
Telephone: (916) 554-2716
STIPULATION & ORDER CONTINUING
STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDING
TIME PERIODS UNDER THE SPEEDY
TRIAL ACT
Plaintiff United States of America and defendant, Armando Vasquez Barragan, by and through their respective counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference to be held on March 19, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until April 9, 2013, and to exclude time between March 19, 2013, and April 9, 2013, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for the defendant desires additional time to consult with his client. Among other things, this case has been ordered related to the case of United States v. Delgado-Ezquivel, et al., 2:11-cr-00076 LKK (E.D. Cal.), and the parties represent that they need time to consider whether the two related cases may be resolved pursuant to a global plea agreement as to defendant Vasquez-Barragan. Additionally, counsel for the defendant will be in trial on March 19, 2013.
b. Counsel for the defendants believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The government does not object to the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 19, 2013, to April 9, 2013, at 9:15 a.m., inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
___________
(as authorized on Mar. 15, 2013)
DANNY D. BRACE
Counsel for Defendant
___________
NIRAV K. DESAI
Assistant U.S. Attorney
ORDER
The parties' stipulation, including the proposed findings, is HEREBY APPROVED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
___________
LAWRENCE K. KARLTON
SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT