Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, the above-captioned matter was set for a status conference before U.S. Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto on Monday, October 7, 2013, at 1:00 p.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to vacate the October 7 status conference, to set the matter for a change of plea on Tuesday, November 12, 2013, at 8:30 a.m. and to exclude time between October 7 and November 12, 2013. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney, KAREN A. ESCOBAR Assistant United States Attorney, Fresno, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
ANTHONY EGBASE, Counsel for Defendant JORGE TORRES.
a. The defendant wishes to enter a guilty plea, pursuant to the plea agreement of the parties. Counsel for the defendant is available November 12 for the change of plea.
b. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny his client continuity of counsel.
c. The government does not object to the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 7, 2013, to November 12, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.