These holdings have come in cases where jury verdicts of guilty on some counts in a multi-count case have been set aside. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 676 F.2d 239, 243 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1091, 101 S.Ct. 887, 66 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981); United States v. Castro, 476 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Berlin, 472 F.2d 1002, 1009 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 949, 93 S.Ct. 3007, 37 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1973); National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. United States, 384 F.2d 457, 462 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 957, 88 S.Ct. 1032, 19 L.Ed.2d 1151 (1968). But see United States v. Eason, 920 F.2d 731, 737 (11th Cir. 1990).

Accordingly, Perlman contends that the police did not have probable cause to seize the jewelry. In support of this argument, Perlman cites United States v. Thomas, 676 F.2d 239, 243 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1091, 101 S.Ct. 887, 66 L.Ed.2d 820 450 U.S. 931, 101 S.Ct. 1392, 67 L.Ed.2d 364 (1981), which held that the "immediately apparent" requirement is intended to prevent police "from using the pretext of `plain view' to conduct general inventory searches for items that may have a suspect character in a context." We first note that Sergeant Devoney's statement is somewhat different in its actual form than as paraphrased above by Perlman.

These motions included a motion to sever Counts Five through Seven of the indictment (the income tax charges) from Counts One through Four (the drug-related charges) as well as the motions of individual conspirators for separate trials on the basis of prejudicial pretrial publicity. A trial court's decision not to grant a motion for severance will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 676 F.2d 239 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949, 93 S.Ct. 269, 34 L.Ed.2d 220 (1972). Defendants have failed to make such a showing in this case.

The short and conclusive answer to this argument is that the jury acquitted appellant on Count III, thereby rendering any potential error harmless. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 676 F.2d 239, 242-43 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1091, 101 S.Ct. 887, 66 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981) (district court's failure to grant motion of acquittal on some counts until after jury returned verdict is harmless error); United States v. Castro, 476 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 1973) (same); cf. Blassingame v. United States, 254 F.2d 309, 310 (9th Cir. 1958) ("error committed as to one count of a multi-count indictment does not require the reversal of a conviction under other counts of that indictment"); 3A Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 854 at 314 (1982) ("If the error related only to a count on which the defendant was acquitted, the error cannot have affected the result and is harmless."). Appellant also challenges the lawfulness of his sentencing.

A showing that a defendant would have a better chance of acquittal in a separate trial does not establish prejudice sufficient to require severance. United States v. Thomas, 676 F.2d 239, 243 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931, 101 S.Ct. 1392, 67 L.Ed.2d 364 (1981). VI

As we have frequently recognized, all relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 676 F.2d 239, 244 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931, 101 S.Ct. 1392, 67 L.Ed. 2d 364 (1981). Relevant evidence should be excluded only if it contains a risk of unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs its probative value.

(1) an officer must legitimately be in a position from which the item is in plain view, (2) the officer's discovery of the item must be inadvertent, and (3) the incriminating nature of the item must be immediately apparent to the officer. Moya v. United States, 761 F.2d 322, 326 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Reed, 726 F.2d 339, 343 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. McDonald, 723 F.2d 1288, 1295 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 977, 104 S.Ct. 2360, 80 L.Ed.2d 831 (1984); United States v. Thomas, 676 F.2d 239, 243-44 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931, 101 S.Ct. 1392, 67 L.Ed.2d 364 (1981); United States v. Schire, 586 F.2d 15, 17-19 (7th Cir. 1978). The seizure of Perry's tennis shoes easily meets the requirements of the plain view exception.

In order to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2313, the government must prove, inter alia, that "the motor vehicle involved was moving in interstate traffic at the time of the defendant's activities." United States v. Thomas, 676 F.2d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1980) (quoting United States v. Brady, 425 F.2d 309, 311 (8th Cir. 1970)). See also United States v. Thornley, 707 F.2d 622, 625 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Browning, 439 F.2d 813, 815 (1st Cir. 1971).

The surveillance photographs were relevant to show appellants' physical association with each other and with locations where gambling activity was carried on. They were corroborative of the surveillance testimony, and, when taken with other evidence, were probative on the issue of illicit association, a predicate for invocation of the coconspirator rule. Surveillance photographs have been held to be relevant in other cases. E.g., United States v. Thomas, 676 F.2d 239, 244 (7th Cir. 1980). The admission of Exhibit 1 was not an abuse of discretion.

All the defendants moved for severance before trial, and renewed their motions during trial. The trial judge's decision not to grant a severance will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 715 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 434, 78 L.Ed.2d 366 (1983); United States v. Thomas, 676 F.2d 239 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1091, 101 S.Ct. 887, 66 L.Ed.2d 820, 450 U.S. 931, 101 S.Ct. 1392, 67 L.Ed.2d 364 (1981); United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124, 1139, 102 S.Ct. 2972, 73 L.Ed.2d 1359 (1982). The defendants have made no such showing in this case.