Opinion
Case No. 2:12-cr-218
10-23-2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM DAVID TAYLOR, SR., Defendants.
JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY
OPINION & ORDER
This matter is again before the Court on Defendant William David Taylor's objections to his guilty verdict. First, Defendant has requested to proceed pro se, with current counsel continuing in an advisory role. (Doc. 58, hereinafter the "First Motion," at 1-3). He also asks the Court to reconsider under the proper criminal rules the motion previously filed by his counsel (Doc. 47), requesting judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial, and to excuse, under Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(b), the delay in the filing of that motion. (Id. at 3-5). In addition, Defendant separately moves the Court for an evidentiary hearing under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32, and § 6A1.3 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. (Doc. 59, hereinafter the "Second Motion").
Defendant has a constitutional right to proceed pro se if he so desires. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). At sentencing, the Court will conduct a colloquy with Defendant to ensure his competency to represent himself, with continuing assistance from his current counsel. Based on Defendant's statements in the Motion, Defendant's request to proceed pro se is therefore PROVISIONALLY GRANTED.
With regard to Defendant's Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial, previously filed under Rules 50 and 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (see Doc. 47), the Court construed this motion as one seeking relief under Rules 29 and 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in its Order on that motion (Doc. 57). That Order addressed both the timing and merits of Defendant's request, and denied it. Defendant has demonstrated no good cause for such excuse. As the Court has explained (see Doc. 57 at 2-3), the Court is without jurisdiction to consider untimely motions under Rules 29 and 33. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 421 (1996); United States v. Hunter, 558 F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir. 2009). A defendant's pro se representation does not insulate him from application of the 14-day time limit under Rules 29 and 33. United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 397-98 (6th Cir. 2001). Defendant's request now that the Court excuse the delay is DENIED.
Accordingly, the First Motion (Doc. 58) is hereby PROVISIONALLY GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
With regard to the Second Motion, requesting an evidentiary hearing: the Court will allow Defendant to introduce evidence at sentencing, under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(2) and § 6A1.3 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Defendant is admonished, however, that such evidence and testimony must relate to sentencing. The Court will not entertain testimony as to Defendant's substantive guilt. The Defendant was found guilty by a jury, and has already attempted to attack his conviction via the motion submitted by counsel nine days ago. Defendant cannot now relitigate at sentencing that which already has been decided twice. No separate evidentiary hearing will be held regarding Defendant's request for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. The Second Motion (Doc. 59) is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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ALGENON L. MARBLEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE