Opinion
STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR CONTINUANCE OF STATUS CONFERENCE
GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., District Judge.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Jill Thomas, Assistant United States Attorney, together with Thomas A. Johnson, counsel for defendant Nelson Gutierrez, Shari Rusk, counsel for defendant Kenneth Tam, Michael Chastaine, counsel for defendant Marco Borja, Clemente Jimenez, counsel for defendant Adalberto Valenzuela-Ruiz, Ronald Peters, counsel for defendant Sherlynn Charles, and Dina Santos, counsel for defendant Gerald Osborne, hereby stipulate to the following:
THOMAS A. JOHNSON, KRISTY M. KELLOGG, Law Office of Thomas A. Johnson, Sacramento, California Attorneys for Nelson Gutierrez.
SHARI RUSK, Attorney for Kenneth Tam.
MICHAEL CHASTAINE, Attorney for Marco Borja.
CLEMENTE JIMENEZ, Attorney for Adalberto Valenzuela-Ruiz.
RONALD PETERS, Attorney for Sherlynn Charles.
DINA SANTOS, Attorney for Gerald Osborne.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for Status Conference on October 23, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the Status Conference to February 19, 2016, and to exclude time between October 23, 2015, and February 19, 2016, under the Local Code T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
a. A continuance is requested because all counsel for the defendants need additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and discuss potential resolutions. Furthermore, defense counsel, Thomas A. Johnson, is unavailable for the currently set date.
b. Counsel for defendants believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The Government does not object to the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of October 21, 2015, to February 19, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
It is so ordered.