Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant, QUENTIN STALLINGS, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 26, 2015
2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until April 23, 2015, and to exclude time between March 12, 2015 and April 23, 2015 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Defense counsel needs more time to consult with defendant regarding his case, specifically, defense counsel has been in trial in Sacramento County Superior Court and needs additional time to review the plea agreement with defendant.
DANNY D. BRACE, JR., LAW OFFICE OF DANNY D. BRACE, JR., Sacramento, CA, Attorney for Defendant.
b. Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 12, 2015 to April 23, 2015, at 9:30 a.m. inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO ORDERED.