United States v. Smith

90 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Tisdol

    544 F. Supp. 3d 219 (D. Conn. 2021)   Cited 8 times
    In Tisdol, the Court found that the three of the Smith factors favored the defendant and that the government's delay was unreasonable and violative of the Fourth Amendment.

    However, an unusual footnote to the affidavit states: The Government submits that the amount of time from seizure of the device to present has not been unreasonable under United States v. Smith , 967 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 2020). In concluding that a 31-day delay was too long, the Smith Court articulated four factors in determining whether a delay is reasonable: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the importance of the seized property to the defendant; (3) whether the defendant had a reduced property interest in the seized item; and (4) the strength of the Government's justification for the delay.

  2. United States v. Delima

    2:22-cr-00111 (D. Vt. Nov. 9, 2023)   Cited 1 times
    Excluding evidence where there was a delay of at least 45 days

    United States v. Smith, 967 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir. 2020). There are four “generally relevant” factors to determine “whether the police have waited an unreasonable amount of time before seeking a search warrant:”

  3. United States v. Wells

    20 Cr. 633 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2023)   Cited 2 times
    Ruling twenty-nine- and fortyeight-day delays unreasonable

    That decision rejected Wells' arguments that the phones were unlawfully seized, that the search warrants were not supported by probable cause, that the search warrants were overly broad and not sufficiently particular, and that there were material omissions in the search warrant affidavits that necessitated a Franks hearing. See id.; see also ECF Nos. 36, 38. Now, Wells argues that there were unreasonable delays between when the Government seized his phones and obtained search warrants, which constitute violations of his Fourth Amendment rights under United States v. Smith, 967 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2020)-a case decided 21 months after the October 2018 seizure and 14 months after the May 2019 seizure-and require the suppression of all evidence obtained from those phones. See ECF No. 88 (“Mot.”).

  4. United States v. Corbett

    20-CR-213 (KAM) (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2021)   Cited 8 times

    (See Schiliro Aff.) The affidavit in support of the warrant application included footnote 2, advising the court of the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Smith (“Smith”), 967 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2020), which addressed, inter alia, the scope of reasonable delay by law enforcement between the seizure of property, specifically a tablet, and an application to search the tablet. (Schiliro Aff. ¶ 7 n.2.

  5. United States v. Daskal

    676 F. Supp. 3d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2023)   Cited 1 times

    The five-month delay in procuring a warrant to search Daskal's Phones following their seizure on May 10, 2018 was, however, unconstitutionally lengthy. See United States v. Smith, 967 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2020). To search a phone obtained pursuant to a lawful arrest, law enforcement must first obtain a search warrant.

  6. United States v. Watson

    23-CR-82(EK) (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2023)   Cited 6 times

    to “prevent its concealment or destruction.” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); see also United States v. Smith, 967 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir. 2020) (“If the police have probable cause to believe that the property contains contraband or evidence of a crime and if it is necessary to seize or secure the property immediately to prevent its destruction or disappearance, the Fourth Amendment allows the police to seize or secure the property without a warrant ....”).

  7. In re Application for Search Warrant

    527 F. Supp. 3d 179 (D. Conn. 2020)   Cited 9 times
    Explaining that where the government does not offer any reason for the delay, this factor weighs against a finding of reasonableness

    The target was arrested at the time of the search on August 12, 2020, and has remained in custody, pending trial on charges lodged in the Connecticut Superior Court, since that date. In a footnote to the Affidavit, the agent indicates that she "is aware of the Second Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Smith, 967 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2020) which held that a thirty-one day delay in obtaining a search warrant to search a tablet computer that was lawfully seized from a car was unreasonable." Doc. #1-1 at 12 n.4.

  8. United States v. Manuel Chang

    18-CR-00681 (NGG) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2024)   Cited 1 times

    Accordingly, any “second seizure” on the part of the FBI passes Fourth Amendment muster, and suppression of said search is denied. This analysis is not to be confused with determining whether-upon receipt of the phone-the delay in obtaining the search warrant was constitutional under United States v. Smith, 967 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2020). (See Section III.B.2.)

  9. United States v. Eisenberg

    707 F. Supp. 3d 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)

    To determine whether a delay is unreasonable, courts look at "[1] the length of the delay, [2] the importance of the seized property to the defendant, [3] whether the defendant had a reduced property interest in the seized item, and [4] the strength of the state's justification for the delay." United States v. Smith, 967 F.3d 198, 203 (2d Cir. 2020) (brackets in original, citation omitted). Under the Second Circuit's decision in Smith, the delay in seeking a warrant to search Eisenberg's devices was unreasonable.

  10. United States v. Fox

    23-CR-227 (NGG) (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 24, 2024)   Cited 1 times

    Agent Shapiro omitted critical details concerning the search, giving the impression that the phone was seized pursuant to a standard border search by CBP, displaying a conscious “disregard of the truth and [ ] heedless indifference to [Fox's] Fourth Amendment rights.” Raymonda, 780 F.3d at 123 (Chin, J. concurring). He also acted with unreasonable delay in applying for the warrant under the principles the Second Circuit articulated the prior year in United States v. Smith, 967 F.3d 198, 213 (2d Cir. 2020).