Opinion
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, MICHELE BECKWITH, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
Danny Brace, Jr., Counsel for Defendant Sergey Shchirskiy.
Christopher Cosca, Counsel for Defendant Vladislav Atamanyuk.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 19, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until May 14, 2015, and to exclude time between March 19, 2015, and May 14, 2015, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports and related documents, as well as tax documents, bank records and other documents obtained via subpoena. The government estimates that this discovery consists of more than 2, 000 pages of documents. All of this discovery is being produced directly to counsel and/or being made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendant Shchirskiy is currently in trial in another case. Counsel for both defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, review the current charges, review the discovery, conduct investigation and research related to the charges, and to otherwise prepare for trial, if necessary.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 19, 2015 to May 14, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.