Second, license revocation has not been historically regarded as punishment. All the federal courts of appeal addressing the nature of driver's license revocation, including this court, have declared that it is remedial. See, e.g., United States v. Schiller, 120 F.3d 192, 194 (9th Cir. 1997) (military suspension of driver's license intended to achieve safety-related civil and remedial goals); Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1137-39 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying Hudson factors); Imngren, 98 F.3d at 816-17; Allen v. Attorney Gen. of Me., 80 F.3d 569, 574 (1st Cir. 1996). Further, to the extent that a license revocation statute has, in addition to its remedial purpose, some deterrent effect (which is often the purpose of a criminal statute), that does not transform the remedial statute into one that is punitive in the constitutional sense.

We have jurisdiction over the district court's collateral order under 18 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review de novo. United States v. Schiller, 120 F.3d 192, 193 (9th Cir. 1997). We affirm the district court's denial of Camacho's motion to dismiss.