Although the analysis was slim, the Fifth Circuit held in United States v. Varkonyi, that § 111 was "sufficiently certain to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated activity [was] forbidden." 645 F.2d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing United States v. Linn, 438 F.2d 456, 458 (10th Cir. 1971) (rejecting argument that 18 U.S.C. § 111 is unconstitutionally vague)); see also United States v. Reyes-Lopez, 141 F. App'x 533, 533 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting vagueness argument because "a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would understand what conduct the [pre-amendment] statute prohibits"); accord United States v. Chestaro, 197 F.3d 600, 606 (2d Cir. 1999). It is at least arguable that this Court is bound by Varkonyi, even though it addressed the pre-amendment statute, because the present law is even more clear.
Id. (quoting United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 685 (1975)). See U.S. v. Reyes-Lopez, 141 Fed. Appx. 533 (9th Cir. 2005) (unpub.) (rejecting vagueness challenge to § 111). --------