Opinion
Case No. 1:90-cr-00090(1)
12-23-2014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SHARMELLA REVELS
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's pro se motion (doc. 33) to expunge the record of her federal convictions for Possession with Intent to Distribute a Schedule III Controlled Substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and Structuring a Financial Transaction in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324. Citing United States v. Lucido, 612 F.3d 871 (6th Cir. 2010), the United States argues that we are without authority to entertain such a motion and requests the Court to dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction (doc. 36).
Although the fact pattern in Lucido differs in one significant respect, we nevertheless agree with the government's position. Sebastian Lucido was acquitted of federal money-laundering charges in two different cases. Fifteen years later, he sought to expunge his arrest records because their "maintenance and publication . . . has caused reputational harm to him and to his money-management business." 612 F.3d at 873. Like Defendant Revels, he filed his motions with the district court under his original criminal case numbers. Both motions were denied on their merits. Lucido appealed, and the Sixth Circuit first addressed whether the district court had had jurisdiction to even entertain his motions. It considered three theories, rejecting each in turn. First, it concluded that the statutory authority that gave the district court its original authority over defendant and the criminal charges with which he was accused, 18 U.S.C. § 3231, did not continue beyond his acquittal. Id. at 873-74. With Section 3231 eliminated, it pondered whether any other statute might serve as a jurisdictional basis. A survey noted authority to entertain expungement requests with regard to particular convictions under the Controlled Substances Act (not applicable to Defendant Revels), inaccurate government records and DNA records, but these obviously differed from what Lucido sought. Id. at 874 (statutory citations omitted).
Finally, in the absence of any direct statutory authority, the Court of Appeals studied whether Section 3231 might confer ancillary jurisdiction on the district court. Joining the First, Third, Eighth and Ninth Circuits, it held that it did not. Id. at 875. It gave particular weight to the nature of Lucido's motion:
Keep in mind that Lucido is not asking the court to remove records of its own proceedings. . . . What Lucido wants is to remove records of the indictments held by the executive branch (the FBI) and kept at the direction of the legislative branch[.]. . . Lucido's request, if granted, would amount to an extraordinary inter-branch incursion, one that should not lightly be effectuated through the federal courts' unexceptional right to oversee their own criminal cases.Id. (emphasis original).
The nature of Defendant Revels' motion is different from the one considered in Lucido. She does not ask the Court to seal her arrest record; rather, she asks the Court to seal its record of her conviction ("In August 1990, I came before you and was sentenced to 51 months in the federal institution in Lexington, Ky. . . . I will be 70 years old my next birthday and even though I already put this 24 year old error behind me I am asking that it be done on paper as well, by having the record expunge[d]" (doc. 33 at 1, 2)). Because these records obviously are within the control of the judicial branch, we are not confronted with a separation of powers quandary. Yet while we regard this difference as factually significant, we do not think it legally dispositive.
As discussed in Lucido, the Supreme Court has identified two legitimate forms of ancillary jurisdiction. 612 F.3d at 874. The first allows a single court to resolve claims that are "factually interdependent" and the second empowers a court to "function successfully," meaning to have the ability to "manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees." Id. at 875 (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1994)). Neither applied in Lucido and nor do they apply here. The fact of Defendant's 1990 conviction and her desire to have it sealed twenty-four years later are not "interdependent" but, rather, at odds. Moreover, the accuracy of the fact of Defendant's conviction has not been challenged. Id. ("So long as the records of what happened in the proceedings . . . are accurate, it is difficult to see what business the courts have as a matter of inherent power in removing any trace of the proceedings" (emphasis added).) As noted by the Ninth Circuit, "[e]xpungement of a criminal record solely on equitable grounds, such as to reward a defendant's rehabilitation and commendable post-conviction conduct," has little to do with Kokkonen's rule limiting a court's exercise of ancillary jurisdiction to only when necessary to "manage proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees." United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, while the accomplishments of which she boasts are indeed praiseworthy, we nevertheless conclude that we are without jurisdiction to entertain Defendant Revels' motion. See United States v. Field, 756 F.3d 911, 914 (6th Cir. 2014) (under Lucido, "federal courts lack ancillary jurisdiction over motions for expungement based on purely equitable considerations—e.g., motions alleging that the movant has maintained good conduct").
Accordingly, we DISMISS Defendant's motion to expunge for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED. Dated: 12/23/14
/s/_________
S. Arthur Spiegel
United States Senior District Judge