Opinion
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, JILL M. THOMAS, AMANDA BECK, Assistant United States Attorneys, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff, United States of America.
DOUGLAS BEEVERS, Counsel for Defendant, Clarence Jason Redoble.
STIPULATION TO MOVE FILING AND HEARING DATES AND TO EXCLUDE TIME PERIOD UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. The defense filed a Motion to Suppress (Dkt. #32) and a Motion for Franks Hearing (Dkt. #33) on July 20, 2015. The court had previously scheduled the defendant's motion hearing for September 3, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, parties jointly move to continue that hearing until October 8, 2015, and to exclude time between September 3, 2015, and October 8, 2015, under Local Codes T4 and E.
3. Additionally, the parties move to continue the filing deadlines for the government's motion responses to September 21, 2015 and for the defense's replies to September 28, 2015.
4. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) Work-related trips will take both government attorneys out of the district on September 3, 2015. Due to previous trial and other commitments, defense counsel is unavailable to participate in the hearing on September 10, 2015 or on September 17, 2015.
b) Responding to the defendant's motions requires the government to perform additional investigation. Some of this work will be memorialized in new discovery materials, which the government plans produce to the defense.
c) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to receive and review this discovery prior to the hearing, to consult with his client about it, and potentially to conduct additional investigation and research related to it.
d) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 3, 2015 to October 8, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. The period of time is also excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(1)(D) [Local Code E] because the delay relates to a pretrial motion awaiting prompt disposition.
5. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.