Opinion
No. 3:16-cr-00147-1
02-11-2021
UNITED STATES of America v. Brian RANDALL
Ahmed A. Safeeullah, U.S. Attorney's Office, Nashville, TN, for United States of America.
Ahmed A. Safeeullah, U.S. Attorney's Office, Nashville, TN, for United States of America.
ORDER
WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR., CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Brian Randall, an inmate at the Federal Correctional Center in Talladega, Florida, has filed a Motion for Compassionate Release (Doc. No. 537). That Motion has been supplemented by counsel (Doc. No. 542), the Government has filed a response in opposition (Doc. No. 543), and Randall has replied (Doc. No. 544). Having fully considered those filings and the entire underlying record, Randall's requests for compassionate release will be denied.
Randall has type 2 diabetes, COPD, and is obese, with a body-mass index of 47. According to the Center for Disease Control (CDC) guidelines, each of these conditions place him "at increased risk of severe illness" or possibly even death were he to contract COVID-19. www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions (all websites last visited Feb. 9, 2021). Because of these conditions, and because Randall's incarceration limits the ability to socially distance and take other preventative measures, the Court finds for purposes of this discussion that these circumstances could be "extraordinary and compelling" within the meaning of the compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
This does not end the inquiry, however. In considering a request for compassionate release, a court is to decide not only whether " ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ warrant a sentence reduction," but also whether a sentence reduction "is warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case," after considering the relevant Section 3553(a) factors. United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098 at 1101, 1107-08 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(I) ). Balancing the Section 3553(a) factors is a matter of discretion for the district court, and the Sixth Circuit has "repeatedly recognized that district courts may deny relief under the § 3553(a) factors even if ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reasons would otherwise justify relief." United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1008 (6th Cir. 2020). Such is the case here.
Randall was a large-scale distributor of methamphetamine in the Lebanon, Tennessee area, which he received via shipments from co-conspirators Herbert and Brenda McGinnis. At least ten individuals were involved in the methamphetamine distribution conspiracy, but Randall was unquestionably the leader of the activity locally. He admitted to being responsible for distributing at least 4.5 kilograms of methamphetamine in the Middle District of Tennessee, and directed the sale of that drug, going so far as to instruct others on what amounts could be sold and at what price. (Presentence Report, "PSR" ¶¶9).
As a result of this activity, Randall was charged by a federal grand jury with eleven counts: one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine; nine counts of distribution and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine; and one count of possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. Randall had an offense level of 39 and, with a criminal history category VI offense, faced a Sentencing Guidelines range from 420 months to life imprisonment. To avoid that advisory Guidelines range and the possibility of a mandatory life sentence were the Government to file notices under 18 U.S.C. § 851 based upon his prior felony convictions, Randall entered into a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement. In it, he agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a 288 month sentence. Even considering COVID-19 and the potential effect it could have on Randall, the Court cannot say that little more than 4 ½ years of imprisonment on a 24-year sentence is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to fulfill the sentencing goals established by Congress.
The Court recognizes Randall is now 55 years old, and has considered his argument that "he is at an age when recidivism drops significantly." (Doc. No. 542 at 6). However, the issue of Randall's potential for re-offending was raised at the original sentencing hearing as a reason for accepting the 288-month agreed-upon sentence, with Randall arguing there that "it is well-established that ‘the propensity to commit crimes declines with age.’ " (Doc. No. 200 at 2) (citation omitted). Moreover, another of the "Key Findings" in the United States Sentencing Commission study on which he now relies states that:
[a] federal offender's criminal history was closely correlated with recidivism rates. Rearrest rates range from 30.2 percent for offenders with zero total criminal history points to 80.1 percent of offenders in the highest Criminal History Category, VI. Each additional criminal history point was generally associated with a greater likelihood of recidivism.
https://www.ussc.gov/research/research-reports/recidivism-among-federal-offenders. Not only does Randall have VI criminal history points, his criminal record makes him a Career Offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. (PSR ¶ 59). His criminal record began when he was 18 years old, and continued virtually unabated until almost the time of his arrest in the instant case.
The Court also recognizes that records from the Bureau of Prisons show Randall has adjusted well in prison, and that he is a hard and conscientious worker at UNICOR. (Doc. No. 537-2 at 1-3). He is to be commended for these efforts. Hopefully this is a sign that Randall is beginning to turn his life around. However, the few years of good conduct can hardly make up for his past history and the crimes for which he is now serving a prison sentence.
Finally, the Court notes that the Government has pointed out that five of Randall's co-conspirators/co-defendants have recently had their requests for compassionate release based upon the COVID-19 pandemic denied by this Court. The Government submits that "[a]llowing their leader to be released while they continue to serve sentences would create an unfair and unwarranted sentencing disparity." (Doc. No. 543 at 9). While Randall objects on the grounds that "[c]ompassionate release, just like an[y] analysis under § 3553(a), inherently requires focus on the individual, not adopting one broad-brush rule for all co-defendants," (Doc. No. 544 at 5), the Government has a point. That point to the side, the applicable Section 3553(a) factors discussed above do not warrant Randall's release.
Like Randall, Sabrina Boblett is obese and has Type II diabetes, and, like Randall, George Marsh has COPD.
--------
Accordingly, Randall's Motions for Compassionate Release (Doc. Nos. 537, 542) are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.