Summary
stating that defendant's arguments for a clear and convincing evidence standard were "foreclosed by our precedent"
Summary of this case from United States v. LucasOpinion
22-50404
05-24-2023
United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Pedro Ramirez-Urbina, Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 4:21-CR-716-1
Before Smith, Southwick, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM [*]
Pedro Ramirez-Urbina appeals the 71-month sentence imposed after his jury trial conviction of conspiring to transport illegal aliens and transporting illegal aliens. He primarily contends that the district court clearly erred in applying a 10-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(7)(D) because the Government failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that his conduct was a but-for cause of Jose Alfredo Lopez-Vasquez's death.
Because Ramirez-Urbina objected to the application of the enhancement below, we review the district court's interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Ruiz-Hernandez, 890 F.3d 202, 211 (5th Cir. 2018). There is no clear error if a factual finding is plausible in light of the record as a whole. Id. at 212.
The Sentencing Guidelines provide that a defendant's offense level is increased by 10 levels "[i]f any person died" during the smuggling or transportation of an illegal alien. § 2L1.1(b)(7)(D). This enhancement will apply if the Government demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's conduct was the but-for cause of an individual's death. United States v. Gaspar-Felipe, 4 F.4th 330, 343 &n.12 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 903 (2022). "But-for causation exists if the result would not have occurred without the conduct at issue." Ruiz-Hernandez, 890 F.3d at 212. We have recognized that this "is not a difficult burden to meet." United States v. Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 2014). We ask "whether the outcome would have occurred in the absence of the action." United States v. Salinas, 918 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 2019).
While the autopsy results were inconclusive, Lopez-Vasquez would not have been lost in the Texas desert for four days in the summer without sufficient water but for Ramirez-Urbina's actions in smuggling him into the United States through the desert. See Gaspar-Felipe, 4 F.4th at 343-44. Simply stated, Ramirez-Urbina was "fully responsible for placing [Lopez-Vasquez] in a precarious position where subsequent but-for causes ultimately took his life." Salinas, 918 F.3d at 467. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err in imposing the Section 2L1.1(b)(7)(D) enhancement. See Ruiz-Hernandez, 890 F.3d at 212.
Ramirez-Urbina also argues that sentencing based on acquitted conduct violates the due process clause; that Section 2L1.1(b)(7)(D) requires that the defendant's conduct be at least the proximate cause of death; and that the district court should have required "clear and convincing" proof of causation rather than proof by a preponderance of the evidence. He correctly concedes, though, that these arguments are foreclosed by our precedent. See Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d at 401-02; United States v. Simpson, 741 F.3d 539, 559 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Farias, 469 F.3d 393, 399-400 (5th Cir. 2006). He states that the arguments are raised only to preserve the claims for further review.
AFFIRMED.
[*] This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.