Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 8, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until December 17, 2015, and to exclude time between October 8, 2015, and December 17, 2015, under Local Code T4.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, CHRISTIAAN H. HIGHSMITH, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff, United States of America.
DINA SANTOS, Counsel for Defendant, SESAR PRADO.
KELLY BABINEAU, Counsel for Defendant, RAMON PRADO.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 100 pages of reports and 8 audio/video discs. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges and the provided discovery, and to discuss potential resolution with their clients in light of the discovery provided to date.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 8, 2015 to December 17, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.