United States v. Pierre

73 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Allen

    Case No. 3:96-cr-00149-RNC-3 (D. Conn. Apr. 26, 2019)   Cited 57 times
    Finding the reasoning of Pierre and Dodd persuasive

    United States v. Martin, No. 03-cr-795, 2019 WL 1558817, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2019) (quoting Davis, 2019 WL 104554, at *2).See also United States v. Dodd, ---F.Supp.3d---, 3:03-cr-00018-3, 2019 WL 1529516, at *2 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 9, 2019); United States v. Pierre, ---F.Supp.3d---, Cr. No. 07-003 WES, 2019 WL 1495123, at *4-5 (D.R.I. Apr. 5, 2019); United States v. Davis, No. 92-cr-4013 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2019), ECF No. 2245 at 2, 9; United States v. Glore, ---F.Supp.3d---, No. 99-cr-82-pp, 2019 WL 1060838, at *5-6 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 6, 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-1663 (7th Cir. Apr. 11, 2019); United States v. Pugh, No. 5:95-cr-145, 2019 WL 1331684, *2 (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 25, 2019); United States v. Vance, Case No. 0:08-cr-60071-WPD (S.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2019), ECF No. 71 ¶ 11; United States v. Couch, No. 0:08-cr-60236-WP (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2019), ECF No. 42 ¶ 7; United States v. Laguerre, No. 5:02-CR-30098-3, 2019 WL 861417, at *3 (W.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2019); United States v. Allen, 8:00-cr-378 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2019), ECF Nos. 63, 66. The government suggests that the term "violation" in the definition of "covered offense" creates an intrinsic ambiguity because it can be construed to refer to the facts of the defendant's "violation" as found by the Court.

  2. United States v. Hardnett

    417 F. Supp. 3d 725 (E.D. Va. 2019)   Cited 24 times
    Holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(B) and the "indictment-controls theory" apply under the First Step Act

    One court has called this § 851 enhancement "a uniquely powerful prosecutorial cudgel: it allows the Government, at its sole discretion, to file an additional charge by information that a defendant has been previously convicted of a drug trafficking offense thereby ratcheting up the mandatory minimum applicable from 5 to 10 years, or 10 to 20 years, or 20 years to life." United States v. Pierre , 372 F. Supp. 3d 17, 20 n.1 (D.R.I. 2019). And this "staggering" increase must be imposed by the Court when the prosecution files the 851 enhancement.

  3. United States v. Wright

    CRIMINAL NO. 1:06-CR-119 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2019)   Cited 1 times

    We disagree. Several courts have concluded that the First Step Act "applies to offenses and not conduct." United States v. Dodd, 372 F. Supp. 3d 795, 797 (S.D. Iowa 2019) (citing United States v. Davis, No. 07-CR-245S, 2019 WL 1054554, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2019)); see United States v. Thompson, No. 1:05CR42, 2019 WL 4040403, at *4-7 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2019) (collecting cases); United States v. Rose, 379 F. Supp. 3d 223, 229-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (same); United States v. Pierre, 372 F. Supp. 3d 17, 22 (D.R.I. 2019) (same). We join those courts to have concluded that eligibility under the First Step Act is defined by the statute of conviction, not the actual conduct supporting a conviction under that statute.

  4. United States v. LeBron

    Cr. No. 05-24-JJM-PAS (D.R.I. Mar. 3, 2020)

    The Fair Sentencing Act reduced the mandatory sentencing range for possession with intent to distribute less than twenty-eight grams of crack cocaine and increased the amount of the drug triggering the five-year mandatory minimum sentence. United States v. Pierre, 372 F. Supp. 3d 17, 19 (D.R.I. 2019). The more lenient minimum sentences instituted by the Fair Sentencing Act were not retroactive.

  5. United States v. Benjamin

    1:18-CV-927 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 6, 2019)

    Just because a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act does not mean he is entitled to such a reduction. United States v. Pierre, 372 F. Supp. 3d 17, 22 (D.R.I. 2019) (noting that "relief under the [First Step] Act is ultimately within the discretion of the Court; there is no automatic reduction"). In deciding whether and to what extent a sentence reduction is appropriate, courts consider the new statutory range, the applicable advisory guideline range, the § 3553(a) factors, views of counsel, and any evidence of post-sentence rehabilitation.

  6. United States v. Abdullah

    410 F. Supp. 3d 346 (D.R.I. 2019)   Cited 4 times
    Articulating and applying formulation

    Since the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 was signed into law, these minimum and maximum penalties are triggered by 28 grams or more of cocaine base, instead of 5 grams. United States v. Pierre, 372 F. Supp. 3d 17, 19 (D.R.I. 2019). In his plea agreement, Abdullah stipulated to distributing 33.47 grams of cocaine base.

  7. United States v. Jones

    No. 10 CR 985 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2019)   Cited 8 times

    As courts within this district and across the country have noted, this approach, focusing on the violation and statute as opposed to the particulars of the record, avoids the need for "the Court to employ a prosecutor-friendly 'way-back machine,' to conjure how the charge, plea, and sentencing would have looked had the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 been in effect." United States v. Pierre, 372 F. Supp. 3d 17, 22 (D.R.I. 2019); accord Johnson, 2019 WL 2590951, at *3. Rather, "because relief under the First Step Act is discretionary, '[i]t makes sense that Congress intended to give a certain class of defendants—those who were sentenced under a statute for which the penalties changed in 2010—a do over.'"

  8. United States v. Stone

    416 F. Supp. 3d 721 (M.D. Tenn. 2019)   Cited 5 times
    In United States v. Stone, No. 3:04-CR-00142, 416 F.Supp.3d 721, 732–33, 2019 WL 4259455, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 6, 2019), on the other hand, Judge Eli Richardson declined to hold a plenary hearing, even "assuming [a court] has such discretion," and chose to reduce defendant's sentence based upon the filings made by the parties.

    Although Defendant, and multiple courts, have decried conduct-controls as involving too much speculation as to what the Government might have done had the post-FSA thresholds been in effect at the time of the defendant's prosecution, there is no discernible reason to believe that the prosecutors who previously sought a mandatory life sentence and claimed to have proof that Defendant's conduct "conservatively" involved 2.835 kilograms of crack would not have alleged a quantity sufficient to reach the highest tier of § 841(b)(1). CompareUnited States v. Pierre , 372 F. Supp. 3d 17 (D.R.I. 2019) (raising uncertainty as to whether the defendant's quantity for purposes of relevant conduct (28.77 grams) on the borderline for the FSA's 28-gram tier would have been convicted on that tier or pled down to lower tier if prosecuted today). There is of course the question of whether the Government could have proved the higher amount, but at least one case subscribing to the conduct-controls theory called an evidentiary hearing to establish those facts, Blocker, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 1132.

  9. United States v. Robinson

    Crim. No. PJM 02-0227 (D. Md. Aug. 13, 2019)   Cited 12 times

    [I]n determining whether a defendant is eligible for relief under § 404 of the First Step Act, the sentencing court should look to whether the offense of conviction was modified by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to determine eligibility; it should refrain from delving into the particulars of the record to determine how this specific defendant committed his or her offense of conviction, and how those facts would have hypothetically affected the charges brought against the defendant under the new statutory regime. United States v. Pierre, 372 F. Supp. 3d 17, 22 (D.R.I. 2019) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Boulding, 379 F. Supp. 3d 646, 652 (W.D. Mich. 2019); United States v. Rose, 379 F. Supp. 3d 223, 228-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); United States v. Stanback, 377 F. Supp. 3d 618, 624 (W.D. Va. 2019); United States v. Dodd, 372 F. Supp. 3d 795, 799 (S.D. Iowa 2019); ECF No. 151 at 13-15 (collecting cases). Robinson was convicted after a jury trial of Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with the Intent to Distribute Cocaine and Cocaine Base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine and Cocaine Base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. ECF No. 42.

  10. United States v. Wright

    No. 03 CR 362-2 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 18, 2019)   Cited 18 times

    As my esteemed colleagues have observed, an approach that focuses on the particulars of the record to determine how the specific defendant committed his or her offense of conviction and how those facts would have hypothetically affected the charges brought against the defendant under the new statutory regime "effectively requires the Court to employ a prosecutor-friendly 'way-back machine,' to conjure how the charge, plea, and sentencing would have looked had the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 been in effect." United States v. Pierre, 372 F. Supp. 3d 17, 22 (D.R.I. 2019); accord Johnson, 2019 WL 2590951, at *3. On the other hand, because relief under the First Step Act is discretionary, "[i]t makes sense that Congress intended to give a certain class of defendants—those who were sentenced under a statute for which the penalties changed in 2010—a do over."