This is sufficient to establish Defendants' standing to seek to have the DEA documents unsealed. See United States v. Pickard, 676 F.3d 1214, 1218 n. 2 (10th Cir.2012) (holding, in mandamus action in these same proceedings, that “there is little doubt that Defendants have Article III standing to seek the unsealing of documents in the file because [Defendants] claim a First Amendment interest in communicating information that they already have”) (citing In re Special Grand Jury 89–2, 450 F.3d 1159, 1172–73 (10th Cir.2006)). We have recently been advised that Pickard's Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) litigation in the District of Arizona has been dismissed, but we do not know whether that dismissal is being appealed or the terms of the dismissal.

Under that exception, a small number of interlocutory orders may qualify as final under § 1291 if the orders "conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); see also United States v. Pickard, 676 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he collateral-order doctrine does not allow a party to appeal an order merely because it creates some inconvenience or disadvantage."). Because all three of these factors must be shown, if one is not met, we need not address the other two. Magic Circle Energy 1981-A Drilling Program v. Lindsey (In re Magic Circle Energy Corp.), 889 F.2d 950, 954 (10th Cir. 1989).

Therefore, Professor Tushnet's interest in the redacted information in the summary judgment opinion constitutes an injury in fact sufficient to satisfy the first prong of Article III standing. 676 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2012). Id. at 1218, n.2.

Defendant has appealed his sentence to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The filing of a notice of appeal "is an event of jurisdictional significance-it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal." United States v. Pickard, 676 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Madrid, 633 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2011). This rule is subject to certain narrow exceptions. For example, a district court may consider collateral matters while an appeal is pending, such a defendant's request for release pending appeal. United States v. Prows, 448 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2006).

The party seeking the writ must show that the right to the writ is 'clear and indisputable.'" United States v. Pickard, 676 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 153 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 911 F.2d 380, 387 (10th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted))); see Allied Chem. Corp., 449 U.S. at 35 ("Only exceptional circumstances, amounting to a judicial usurpation of power, will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.")See also Allied Chem. Corp., 449 U.S. at 36 ("our cases have answered the question as to the availability of mandamus in situations such as this with the refrain: 'What never? Well, hardly ever!'"

On April 16, 2012 the Tenth Circuit determined that the defendants could not appeal this court's order of September 7, 2011 because it was not an appealable order. United States v. Pickard, _ F.3d _, 2012 WL 1259012 at * 2 (10th Cir. 2012). The court also held that mandamus relief was not appropriate.