Opinion
21-6722
06-27-2022
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. RAFAEL PARADA-MENDOZA, a/k/a Cheve, a/k/a Chevi, a/k/a Cheby, Defendant-Appellant.
Rafael Parada-Mendoza, Appellant Pro Se.
UNPUBLISHED
Submitted: May 17, 2022
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O'Grady, Senior District Judge. (1:08-cr-00132-LO-2)
Rafael Parada-Mendoza, Appellant Pro Se.
Before DIAZ and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM
Rafael Parada-Mendoza appeals the district court's order denying his motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 ("the Act"). After sua sponte raising the administrative exhaustion requirements under the Act, the district court determined that Parada-Mendoza had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and denied the motion without prejudice. We vacate and remand.
A district court may reduce a term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) if "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). A reduction may be granted upon a motion filed by either the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) or "the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
We recently held in United States v. Muhammad, 16 F.4th 126, 129-30 (4th Cir. 2021), that, "[a]lthough [§ 3582(c)(1)(A)] plainly requires [a prisoner] to complete certain steps before filing his motion [for compassionate release] in the district court, . . . this requirement [is] non-jurisdictional, and thus waived if it is not timely raised." Id. at 129. Because the district court sua sponte raised the administrative exhaustion issue in Muhammad, we held that the court reversibly erred when it dismissed Muhammad's motion for compassionate release "based on the threshold requirement, even assuming [Muhammad] had not completed the prerequisites to suit." Id. at 130.
The district court here did not have the benefit of our decision in Muhammad when it sua sponte raised the administrative exhaustion issue and denied Parada-Mendoza's motion for compassionate release on exhaustion grounds. We therefore vacate the court's order denying Parada-Mendoza's motion for compassionate release and remand for further proceedings in light of our decision in Muhammad. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED.