Opinion
SCOTT N. CAMERON, (SBN 226605) Attorney at Law, Sacramento, CA, Counsel for Defendant.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant NINA NGUYEN, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 22, 2013, at 9 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until April 5, 2013, and to exclude time between February 22, 2013, and April 5, 2013, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has produced approximately 4,844 pages of discovery to the defense.
b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review the document discovery, consult with the client regarding the discovery, conduct investigation, and to discuss potential resolution with his client and the government.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 22, 2013, to April 5, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
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4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.