Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; (PROPOSED) FINDINGS AND ORDER
GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge.
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties hereto, through their respective counsel, as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 6, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until October 25, 2013, and to exclude time between September 6, 2013, and October 25, 2013, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
HEATHER WILLIAMS, Federal Defender, DOUGLAS BEEVERS, Assistant Federal Defender, Attorney for EMMA NERSESYAN, Defendant.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, LEE S. BICKLEY, Assistant United States Attorney, CANDACE A. FRY, Sacramento, CA, Attorney for AGVAN NERSESYAN, Defendant.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 745 pages of documents. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b. Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to request further discovery from the Government and to discuss potential resolutions with the Government and their clients. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The government does not object to the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 6, 2013, to October 25, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.