Opinion
Crim. No.: 15-254 (SCC)
10-28-2020
UNITED STATES, Plaintiff, v. Félix Javier DE JESÚS NEGRÓN, Defendant.
Seth Erbe, Teresa S. Zapata-Valladares, United States Attorneys Office District of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Seth Erbe, Teresa S. Zapata-Valladares, United States Attorneys Office District of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
ORDER
SILVIA CARREÑO-COLL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
On September 1, 2020, Defendant Félix Javier De Jesús Negrón filed a motion requesting compassionate release from FCI Fort Dix pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) due to the alleged threat posed to his health by Covid-19. See Docket No. 1346. Specifically, Defendant seeks a reduction in sentence to time-served and to be released to home confinement. The Government opposed Defendant's petition, arguing that he had failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing with this Court. See Docket No. 1352. After reviewing the parties’ arguments, we find that compassionate release of Defendant is not warranted at this time and his motion is denied without prejudice.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act on December 21, 2018, a court may not modify a final sentence unless the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") recommends such modification or the defendant requests it after exhausting all administrative remedies. Even in such circumstances, the court must find that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction" and that "such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
This section also provides for modification by the court where the defendant is over 70 years of age and has served at least 30 years in prison, among other conditions, but those factors are not applicable here.
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Here, Defendant provides no evidence that he has exhausted his administrative remedies with the BOP. Indeed, Defendant argues that exhaustion is futile because "no matter how quickly the Petitioner pursues an additional administrative process the harm suffered while waiting for exhaustion is irreparable" and "the BOP cannot or will not provide the relief requested in this petition." See Docket No. 1346, pgs. 4-5. However, as the Government notes in its opposition, futility is not an exception to the strictures of the compassionate release statute, and, even if it were, Defendant's conclusory argument that his efforts seeking relief with the BOP would yield no results are unsupported. Without exhaustion of his administrative remedies or a recommendation from the BOP, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) makes it clear the Court has no jurisdiction to reduce Defendant's sentence.
Even if the Court were to excuse Defendant's lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies, he has failed to provide an "extraordinary and compelling reason" for his release. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(I). Defendant mentions that he is medically vulnerable but provides no further support of such a statement. The record indicates that Defendant is thirty-one years old, has not provided the Court with any medical records indicating a pre-existing medical condition that makes him more vulnerable to Covid-19 than the general population, has nearly three years left of his sentence and has not established that he would not pose a danger to society if released given his drug and firearm convictions. In light of these considerations, we do not see how Defendant's case in particular warrants compassionate release. See United States v. Raia , 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020) ("We do not mean to minimize the risks that COVID-19 poses in the federal prison system ... But the mere existence of COVID-19 in society and the possibility that it may spread to a particular prison alone cannot independently justify compassionate release, especially considering BOP's statutory role, and its extensive and professional efforts to curtail the virus's spread.").
While we fully recognize the dangers posed by the Covid-19 pandemic, we agree with the Government that bypassing the administrative options in place with the BOP is not the solution, and without any reason why Defendant specifically is affected by such dangers, we find that modification of Defendant's sentence in these circumstances is inconsistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the applicable policy statements. Moreover, Defendant has failed to establish the Court's jurisdiction over a modification of his sentence to home confinement given that, by statute, the BOP is solely responsible for determining an inmate's place of incarceration. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Compassionate Release at Docket No. 1346 is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.